The role of USAID and development assistance in combating terrorism

Military Review, March-April, 2007 by Thomas Baltazar, Elisabeth Kvitashvili

SINCE 11 SEPTEMBER 2001, the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) has played an increasingly prominent role in the War on Terrorism. (1) The agency's humanitarian and development assistance programs, especially those directed toward at-risk populations and regions, have been recognized as critical components in the U.S. National Strategy for Combating Terrorism and its accompanying National Implementation Plan. (2) These programs can play a crucial role in denying terrorists sanctuary and financing by diminishing the underlying conditions that cause local populations to become vulnerable to terrorist recruitment. Moreover, USAID programs directed at strengthening effective and legitimate governance are recognized as key tools with which to address counterinsurgency.

Historically, USAID supported national security objectives by providing humanitarian assistance and fostering long-term economic and political progress in the developing world. However, as a result of a changing international environment, USAID was increasingly tasked to respond not only to humanitarian crises such as floods and famines, but also to complex emergencies in places like Somalia, Rwanda, the former Yugoslavia, and, more recently, to crises in Sudan, Afghanistan, and Lebanon. Government-wide recognition of the importance of development in shoring up states prone to instability and vulnerable to terrorism has led to its designation as the third "D" in the 2002 U.S. National Security Strategy (NSS). (3) This designation makes development--along with diplomacy and defense--one of the key pillars of national security. The National Security Strategy noted that "development reinforces diplomacy and defense, reducing long-term threats to our national security by helping to build stable, prosperous, and peaceful societies." (4)

Addressing Risk Factors

This change in doctrine led to internal and external changes at USAID. Internally, a white paper identified instability and conflict--present in many countries where USAID operates--as conditions terrorists seek to exploit. The paper noted the need for short-term, conflict-sensitive programming to stabilize these environments before USAID could implement its long-term, traditional development programs. In 2003, USAID established the Office of Conflict Management and Mitigation (CMM) to lead efforts to better identify the underlying causes of instability, conflict, and extremism and to design programs to ameliorate them.

The 2002 NSS also emphasized a "whole-of-government" approach to the War on Terrorism. Although various USAID offices, such as the Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance and the Office of Transition Initiatives, have worked with the Department of Defense (DOD) and other federal agencies to conduct humanitarian assistance, stabilization, and reconstruction operations, the new strategy determined that a more holistic, integrated development-defense-diplomacy approach was required. Recognizing the need for a USAID specific entity to support this integrated interagency approach, USAID established the Office of Military Affairs (OMA) in 2005 to serve as the focal point for interactions between USAID and DOD, to improve USAID's capacity to work with governmental agencies and other actors in synchronized national-security programming, and to help develop USAID positions on national security issues. The office is staffed by former military officers, Foreign Service officers, and subject-matter specialists.

These internal and external changes have already produced a number of interagency initiatives to thwart terrorism. Some examples include the Trans-Sahara Counter-Terrorism Initiative (TSCTI) and the newly planned joint counter-extremism projects in the Horn of Africa. (5)

Launched in 2004, TSCTI targets extremism, instability, and violence in the Sahel region of Africa. Supported by USAID's West Africa Regional Mission and several country missions and embassies, the State Department, USAID, and DOD's European Command (EUCOM) conducted joint assessments in several Sahelian countries to identify causes of extremism and terrorist recruitment. The assessments identified a number of factors, including remoteness, porous borders, proximity to known terrorist groups, large marginalized and/or disenfranchised populations, and exclusion from political processes, as key causes of instability in the region. Recommendations from the assessments led to targeted interventions in Mali, Niger, and Chad. Examples of such intervention include youth development, former combatant reintegration, education, rural radio and media programs, peace building/conflict management, and small-scale infrastructure projects such as drilling wells and constructing schools. USAID's TSCTI advisor maintains regular contact with EUCOM regarding the implementation of these programs.

In the Horn of Africa, USAID, the State Department, and the Combined Joint Task Force for Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA) are collaborating on a number of counter-extremism projects based on a USAID funded assessment that examined the causes of extremism and identified the most unstable areas in the region. To implement these initiatives, CJTF-HOA is building or rehabilitating essential infrastructure such as schools, clinics, and wells (hardware), while USAID is providing educational and medical training and resources, developing instructional materials, and building institutional capacity (software).