The U.S. joint task force experience in Liberia

Military Review, May-June, 2005 by Blair A. Ross, Jr.

DURING THE SUMMER and early fall of 2003, U.S. military forces conducted stability operations and support operations (SOSO) in Liberia to help prevent an impending humanitarian disaster. Conducted in an uncertain security environment, this joint and combined operation involved U.S. land, air, sea, and special operations forces (SOF) and the military forces of eight West African countries. This is the story of how a relatively small U.S. force using reachback technology and intensive interagency coordination helped an untried West African force secure the Liberian capital of Monrovia for the resumption of humanitarian operations.

In July 2003, Liberia was in the death throes of a 23-year civil war. Under attack on two fronts, Liberian President Charles Taylor's government forces prepared for the final defense of the capital. Desperate for security and food, thousands of Liberian civilians flocked to camps established for "internally displaced persons." In addition to the obvious need to prevent human suffering, the United States wanted to reduce the risk of Liberia becoming a source of regional instability. However, it was critically important that the United States not be drawn into a mission of unlimited duration while demonstrating its support for the Liberia peace process, because the U.S. military was already stretched thin because of the Global War on Terrorism. The U.S. military presence in Liberia was an economy of force operation.

The Liberian Crisis

Liberia was established by freed American slaves in 1847. Although it had once been a prosperous nation, it began to spiral downward after Samuel Doe's bloody coup in 1980. Charles Taylor, the charismatic but corrupt president of Liberia, came to power in a questionable election in 1997. Under UN indictment for alleged war crimes in Sierra Leone, Taylor was preoccupied with his own war against two rebel factions: Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy (LURD) and the Movement for Democracy in Liberia (MODEL).

Through the first half of 2003, short but violent engagements characterized the fighting between rebel and government forces. Roving bands of armed fighters, many high on drugs, preyed on defenseless civilians. Both sides employed thousands of child soldiers. The collapse of security in Monrovia forced the UN and other humanitarian organizations to leave the country. By late July, thousands of frightened civilians streamed toward the capital in search of food and safety.

In March 2003, U.S. European Command (EUCOM) began intensely monitoring the situation in Liberia. With the situation continuing to deteriorate, EUCOM dispatched a survey and assessment team and a U.S. Navy SEAL platoon to Monrovia. In early July, EUCOM bolstered embassy security with a Fleet Anti-Terrorism Security Team Platoon. EUCOM also deployed a humanitarian and assistance survey team to determine the extent of the humanitarian crisis. In mid-July, EUCOM pre-positioned the 398th Air Expeditionary Group in Freetown, Sierra Leone, and Dakar, Senegal. EUCOM also placed SOF in neighboring countries, in preparation for a possible noncombatant evacuation of U.S. citizens.

On 17 July, the U.S. Army Southern European Task Force (SETAF) (Airborne), under the command of Major General Thomas R. Turner, received warning orders from EUCOM and U.S. Army Europe to establish a joint task force (JTF) by 25 July. Organized and manned as the core of a JTF headquarters, the task force's practiced JTF procedures, and the reachback capabilities of its command and control (C2) facility near Vicenza, Italy, made it well suited to lead the military effort in Liberia.

Manning proved to be one of the most challenging aspects of forming the JTF. SETAF used EUCOM Directive 55-11, "Joint Task Force Headquarters, Policies, Procedures and Organization," as the base document for building the Joint Manning Document (JMD). However, delays in filling the EUCOM-validated JMD affected the initial planning effort. Fortunately, the warning order to establish the JTF came just as SETAF was conducting its annual staff certification for newly arrived personnel. Exercise participants and trainers from the Army's Battle Command Training Program at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, were already on hand and proved to be a fortuitous initial augmentation of the JTF staff.

Mission Analysis

From a U.S. policy perspective, a regional African force was best suited to provide short- and long-term solutions in Liberia. JTF planners understood that U.S. forces would play an enabling role in support of a West African force with minimal U.S. boots on the ground. The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), a regional entity with political, economic, and military dimensions, provided the African force.

The ECOWAS Ceasefire Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) had intervened in an earlier Liberian civil war during the 1990s with several negative consequences. Determined to overcome the stigma of ECOMOG, ECOWAS leaders selected Nigerian Brigadier General Festus Okonkwo to lead the ECOWAS Mission in Liberia (ECOMIL). In 1997, Okonkwo had served as a battalion commander during the ill-fated ECOMOG mission and was keenly aware of the need for ECOMIL to perform well. Okonkwo and many of his subordinate leaders in the ECOMIL force had trained in U.S. Army schools. They were professional, competent, experienced commanders, and most spoke English.