The U.S. joint task force experience in Liberia

Military Review, May-June, 2005 by Blair A. Ross, Jr.

In contrast, the warring factions were ragtag organizations. LURD and MODEL had precarious leadership, no reliable logistical support, and their forces tended to culminate quickly. Government forces loyal to Taylor, while better organized, suffered from low morale and a sense that the end of the Taylor era was near. Like their rebel enemies, they frequently engaged in wholesale looting in an effort to strip the country of all they could before Liberia collapsed into a failed state.

Given the nature of humanitarian operations and Liberia's operational environment, JTF planners knew mission success would be predicated on a strong interagency effort. The sheer scope of the problem in Monrovia alone required close coordination with the U.S. Department of State, the U.S. Embassy in Monrovia, and the UN.

Understanding the agendas of the various stakeholders in Liberia would be key to a successful interagency effort. As the commander of an enabling force, the JTF commander would be required to lead by persuasion. The UN's immediate goal was to secure Monrovia for humanitarian relief. The larger goal was to build a peacekeeping force to eventually secure all of Liberia. Several humanitarian officials made public statements that underscored their desire for greater U.S. diplomatic, economic, and military involvement. Some made statements that belied their lack of faith in ECOMIL.

The daily worsening of the humanitarian situation in Liberia, and the subsequent international pressure on U.S. President George W. Bush's Administration to do something decisive, generated a requirement for U.S. military forces to deploy quickly and participate directly in the operation. Despite the need for a rapid U.S. response, it was important for the JTF commander to minimize the number of U.S. boots on the ground. Political considerations dictated that U.S. forces could not be the mission lead.

Accordingly, the JTF determined deploying ECOMIL forces was the operational center of gravity. The JTF would need to play a central role in assessing the readiness of ECOMIL forces, equipping them as necessary and facilitating the deployment of the vanguard and remaining forces. Without a timely deployment in sufficient numbers to achieve the immediate security objectives, thousands of Liberian civilians would be at risk. An additional consideration was that the ECOMIL force would be the advance guard of an eventual 15,000-strong UN force. A slow or unsuccessful deployment would hinder the UN's effort to solicit troops for the follow-on force.

After a detailed mission analysis, the JTF produced a concise mission statement: "When directed, JTF Liberia deploys to provide support to ECOWAS forces' stability operations in [the] vicinity of Monrovia, Liberia, in order to mitigate a humanitarian crisis and set conditions for introduction of a follow-on, UN-led international peacekeeping force." As planning progressed, the JTF commander's intent clearly defined the key tasks and the end-state conditions necessary for mission accomplishment. Key tasks included--