The U.S. joint task force experience in Liberia

Military Review, May-June, 2005 by Blair A. Ross, Jr.

In addition to the improving humanitarian situation, the political front gained momentum. In mid-September, the UN Security Council passed a resolution authorizing the UN Mission in Liberia (UNMIL). While this was good news for the future of Liberia, it did not put to rest a continuing debate about whether all ECOMIL forces would be "blue-hatted" as part of UNMIL. Eventually, ECOMIL's success on the ground and the JTF commander's persuasive arguments convinced UN officials to keep ECOMIL forces as part of the follow-on UN force.

During the last week of September, with the humanitarian disaster averted and UN advance headquarters established in Monrovia, the JTF made final preparations for the disengagement of U.S. forces. On 26 September, the Iwo Jima ARG moved back over the horizon, no longer visible from Monrovia. By 30 September, the last of the three Marine liaison teams with ECOMIL forces redeployed to the ship. That afternoon, the JTF commander and the forward staff flew out of Liberia. The mission of JTF Liberia was accomplished.

Demonsterated Success

The U.S. military mission in Liberia was an unqualified success. Coalition operations, competing agendas among numerous stakeholders, destroyed infrastructure, and an uncertain security environment illustrated the complexity of conducting SOSO in sub-Saharan Africa. Although the total number of U.S. troops on the ground in Liberia never rose above 320, their presence and that of a naval ARG sent a powerful message that helped achieve U.S. national military objectives. Further, the operation clearly demonstrated that a relatively small forward U.S. military presence, empowered by reachback technology and strong interagency coordination, could enable a locally provided regional force to achieve tremendous results.

JTF Liberia Lessons Learned

Mission Analysis. Mission analysis is the most essential step of the military decisionmaking process (MDMP). If you get this step wrong, you will not be able to clearly define the mission or adequately plan the operation. Mission analysis also requires constant emphasis when conducting the deliberate MDMP. Once operations begin, you must stay focused on the letter of the mission and the commander's intent. Competing agendas can easily lead to mission creep.

Standing Up and Manning the JTF. A split-based joint task force (JTF) underscores the need for a standing joint force headquarters (JFHQ). A JFHQ at the operational/tactical level, or a standing JFHQ such as Joint Forces Command, enables the JTF commander and staff to focus on command functions forward while control functions are exported to the JFHQ. A standing JFHQ mitigates many of the problems the JTF encounters in filling the joint manning document. A need exists to incorporate JTF joint manning documents into U.S. European Command (EUCOM) Directive 55-11, "Joint Task Force Headquarters, Policies, Procedures, and Organization."

Multiple Stakeholder Agendas. Multiple stake, holders must understand the agendas of other stakeholders, especially among humanitarian organizations who have a vested interest in U.S. forces assuming a greater role. Individual organizations and leaders should be treated as components of intelligence preparation of the battlefield, and their agendas and how they can change the mission focus should be understood.