The story behind the National Security Act of 1947

Military Review, May-June, 2008 by Charles A. Stevenson

Even before the 1944 elections, Truman made it clear he supported unification of the Armed Forces. In a magazine article, he wrote: "The end, of course, must be the integration of every element of America's defense in one department under one authoritative, responsible head. Call it the War Department or the Department of National Security or what you will, just so it is one department ... One team with all the reins in one hand." (6) He later told his staff that wartime experience had hardened his views: "We must never fight another war the way we fought the last two," he told his staff. "I have the feeling that if the Army and the Navy had fought our enemies as hard as they fought each other, the war would have ended much earlier." (7)

The Postwar Challenge

World War II had convinced most American political and military leaders that isolation was no longer possible, and that postwar security required U.S. involvement and leadership. Roosevelt especially wanted to avoid repeating mistakes made after World War I, when the United States retreated from the world stage and refused to join the League of Nations. Thus, the administration consulted with congressional leaders in 1943 and 1944 to build support for postwar institutions to promote security and economic growth. The United States took the lead and built new international organizations that reflected and helped maintain its superpower status. A conference at Bretton Woods, New Hampshire, in 1944 devised the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. A San Francisco conference in 1945 established the United Nations, a global body to keep the peace and deter aggression, but subject to an American veto.

The role of military power in this postwar world was not clear in 1945 and 1946. The Soviet Union had been a wartime ally and was just beginning to demonstrate its uncooperativeness in rebuilding a democratic Europe. Only the United States had atomic bombs, but there was still debate on whether these were merely bigger explosives or a quantum leap requiring a completely new strategy. A few theorists--mainly air power advocates--argued that all you needed for future conflicts was an Air Force, but most military men foresaw the requirement for a full spectrum of ground, sea, and air capabilities.

How to organize and equip these forces was another challenge. The wartime disputes made Army leaders determined to centralize command and control. They also thought that a single budget bill for all services would best protect Army programs, since they had already witnessed political enthusiasm for ships and planes in separate measures in previous years. Army aviators, long envious of the Royal Air Force's independent status since 1918, were determined to achieve a separate Air Force, but they believed that goal was likely as an equal branch within a unified department. (8)

The Navy valued its autonomy and traditions and was resistant to change, as even Franklin Roosevelt acknowledged: "The Treasury and the State Department put together are nothing compared with the Na-a-vy. The admirals are really something to cope with--and I should know. To change anything in the Na-a-vy is like punching a feather bed. You punch it with your right and you punch it with your left until you are finally exhausted, and then you find the damn bed just as it was before you started punching." (9) The Marine Corps, which had survived Theodore Roosevelt's efforts to amalgamate it into the Navy and drastically reduce its role, was also determined to protect its size and separate identity. (10)