The story behind the National Security Act of 1947

Military Review, May-June, 2008 by Charles A. Stevenson

Throughout 1946, both sides made their case in every available forum. While pumping out its own propaganda very effectively, the Navy also seized upon statements by its opponents that confirmed their worst suspicions. In March, Carl Spaatz, new commanding general of the Army Air Forces, made a supposedly off-the-record talk to aviation writers in which he said, "The Air Force that the nation must have, if it is to be properly protected, is the Army Air Force. It would be a waste of the taxpayers' money to have two.... Why should we have a Navy at all? ... In this day and age, talking of fighting the next war on the oceans is a ridiculous assumption. It will be fought in the air by an Air Force." (25) His remarks did not stay off the record for long.

Even Dwight Eisenhower got caught, in a secret memo to the JCS, recommending limiting the Marine Corps to 50,000 or 60,000 men, one-tenth of their size in World War II. The Marine Corps commandant, General Alexander Vandegrift, revealed the Eisenhower proposal in congressional testimony in May 1946, creating such a firestorm that Truman's unification bill was set aside for the rest of the year. (26)

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Chairman Elbert Thomas (D-UT) of the Senate Military Affairs Committee brought a few of his members to meet with Truman on 4 April to discuss the bill they were preparing to report. They went through the measure paragraph by paragraph, and the president was pleased. He pledged to do everything possible to push for passage. The Thomas bill created a Council of Common Defense and a Unified Department of Common Defense. It also created a Joint Staff of the Service Chiefs and a Chief of Staff of Common Defense. (27)

On 13 May, Truman orchestrated a meeting of senior civilian and military officials to try to break the impasse and get them behind a common bill. His staff had persuaded him to drop the idea of a single chief of staff in the hope of getting Forrestal's support for a single department headed by a single secretary. He got his military liaison officer, Admiral William D. Leahy, to suggest that compromise. Then Truman himself said he agreed that there was some danger of "the man on horseback," and the provision should be dropped. Secretary of War Patterson said he was not prepared to "jump into the ditch and die" for the single chief of staff. (28) Forrestal and Patterson then agreed to report back by the end of the month.

Their 31 May letter noted agreement on eight points, including creation of a National Security Council, a Central Intelligence Agency, and a JCS without a single chief or chairperson. However, Forrestal and Patterson remained in disagreement on the issues of a single department, a single civilian secretary, and the status of naval aviation and the Marine Corps. Truman responded two weeks later with his position on the disputed issues: he was for a single department and three coordinate services, but also for substantial naval aviation and guaranteed status for the Marine Corps. (29)