Nato's Gamble: Combining Diplomacy and Airpower in the Kosovo Crisis 1998-1999

Military Review,  May-June, 2008  by James Cricks

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NATO'S GAMBLE: Combining Diplomacy and Airpower in the Kosovo Crisis 1998-1999, Dag Henriksen, Naval Institute Press, Annapolis, MD, 2007, 304 pages, $24.00.

In Nato's Gamble, Dag Henricksen, a European airpower expert, analyzes Operation Allied Force, the confusing brawl that became NATO's gamble in the 1999 Kosovo crisis. With significant insights into American and European perspectives on the application of airpower, Henrickson exposes the frailties apparent in NATO even during this limited operation. Military leaders involved in future planning for Afghanistan, the Balkans, or other NATO areas of interest should carefully consider the political realities Henricksen has detailed.

As armed confrontation with Serbia's Slobodan Milosevic loomed, many Europeans felt that Secretary of State Madeleine Albright and the U.S. had pushed them into the middle of a civil war for which they had no appetite. At a minimum, they wanted UN authorization before they struck another sovereign European nation. General Wesley Clark and diplomat Richard Holbrooke then sold them on a short air campaign that almost evolved into a full-scale ground war in tough terrain. Throughout the operation, the U.S. maintained a unilateral command structure, hitting targets the other NATO nations were unaware of. As a result of all these U.S. machinations, European loyalty to this transformed Cold War institution was sorely tested, and the effects of 1999 are still being felt today.

Henricksen gives a voice to Lieutenant General Walter Short and other airpower enthusiasts frustrated by NATO political decision-making. Nineteen nations were struggling to achieve consensus concerning targets. Interestingly, Donald Rumsfeld also criticized NATO during the war. He preferred the shock-and-awe technique he would later use in Iraq. Clark was skeptical of Rumsfeld's approach and wanted to attack Serbian ground forces in Kosovo instead. NATO clearly had the means to compel Milosevic, but the "gamble" was mustering the will to prosecute an ever-bloodier operation. As the British Defence Committee assessed after Kosovo, NATO is not a precise instrument to support diplomacy. NATO consensus has been made even more complex since the Kosovo intervention by the addition of seven more nations.

In this early historical look into Operation Allied Force, Henriksen has mined many of the best unclassified sources from both sides of the Atlantic. More deserves to be written on this subject as classified sources become available, since airpower will continue to be an attractive choice to send diplomatic messages. I applaud Dag Henricksen for providing an important early contribution to this discussion.

James Cricks, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

COPYRIGHT 2008 U.S. Army CGSC
COPYRIGHT 2008 Gale, Cengage Learning