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Industry: Email Alert RSS FeedTitle 10 domestic humanitarian assistance: New Orleans
Military Review, May-June, 2008 by Michael C. Donahue
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One such operation was at Mardi Gras World in 1-5 Cavalry's AOR, a designated FEMA point of distribution. Here the Black Jack Brigade made medical assistance visits on successive days (14 and 15 September) and provided care to more than 475 residents. Results were similar at Pastor Brown's Greater Saint Mary's Fellowship in the 3-82 Field Artillery Battalion's sector. Critical to the success of these and similar medical assistance missions was a detailed information operations plan coordinated at the brigade and battalion levels. This plan included passing out paper handbills at FEMA points of distribution days in advance of the MEDCAP missions and using vehicle-mounted loudspeaker teams to announce the visits throughout the community. Residents of Algiers welcomed the medical assistance and credited the units for getting the word out in advance of the operation.
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In the meantime, the utilities were restored, which meant that the Jo Ellen Medical Center could reopen once the staff returned. The brigade civil affairs officer and provost marshal confirmed that medical facilities in neighboring Jefferson Parish were open and receiving patients, and that 911 systems were functioning for emergency medical transport, police, and fire. With these restorations, the brigade concluded that it had met its military end state in health care.
Achieving End states
On 14 September 2005, Colonel Bryan Roberts, commander of the 2d Brigade, 1st Cavalry Division, briefed Major General William B. Caldwell IV, Commanding General, 82d Airborne Division, and local New Orleans officials on the status of Algiers. After presenting the brigade's assessment, Roberts concluded that Algiers had progressed to the point where local law enforcement could maintain law and order without military assistance, and that essential services and infrastructure were restored to the point that local officials could resume pre-hurricane daily operations. He recommended that Algiers be considered an economy of force mission, be handed over to a smaller contingent of forces (active or reserve component), and that the brigade be assigned another mission or redeployed. Less than two weeks after arriving in New Orleans, and having done relatively little compared to external civilian agencies to alter conditions in the city, the Black Jack Brigade was ordered back to Fort Hood. The brigade received redeployment instructions on 15 September and began movement by ground convoy, commercial bus, and air on the 16th. It closed on Fort Hood on 18 September.
Katrina's Lessons
While the Black Jack Brigade was able to deploy quickly to New Orleans and establish a command and control structure that put almost 1,700 troops onto the streets of Algiers, Operation Cavalry Rescue highlighted a number of problems in the deployment of federal troops for domestic assistance missions.
Using Title 10 troops within the continental United States to assist in humanitarian relief operations or domestic disturbances is a politically complicated issue. As aforementioned, absent a declared state of emergency in which the president has suspended the Posse Commitatas Act, Title 10 troops are prohibited from conducting law enforcement operations. Published and disseminated "rules for the use of force" (RU F) clearly explain that federal Soldiers may use force only under the most stringent set of conditions and only when criminal acts directly interfere with the accomplishment of a specific military mission. The RUF for active-duty military thus precludes using force to prevent or stop crime. Consequently, criminals technically have immunity from arrest by Title 10 military forces. For example, an active-duty military unit on patrol in New Orleans that passes by a Wal-Mart being looted by locals cannot apprehend the looters. Nor can its Soldiers legally arrest a citizen to prevent a violent crime unless the conduct of that crime directly interferes with the stated military mission. In sum, absent a suspension of Posse Commitatus, Title 10 military forces are largely impotent in domestic security roles.
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