Title 10 domestic humanitarian assistance: New Orleans

Military Review, May-June, 2008 by Michael C. Donahue

The success of Operation Cavalry Rescue from a security standpoint was, as previously mentioned, more a factor of potential criminals not understanding these constraints than of any positive action on the part of Soldiers.

Military leaders are usually aggressive decision makers. They are trained to use initiative and are conditioned to take positive action. staffs and subordinate leaders in active military units are accustomed to working with this spirit. They have a natural inclination to develop the tactics, techniques, and procedures necessary to succeed, and they possess enough imagination to work along the boundaries of constitutional constraints.

Such was the case in Algiers, where 2d Brigade minimized Title 10 limitations by establishing a quasi-official relationship with Task Force Lonestar, a military police Reserve battalion out of Texas. Task Force Lonestar's military policemen, who were law enforcement professionals mobilized under Title 32 of the U.S. Code (and therefore not under the same constraints as active component forces), were integrated into 2d Brigade's subordinate unit patrols as "advisors." They were neither in charge of, nor subordinate to, the federal troops. These advisors worked alongside Black Jack Soldiers and provided lawful policing capabilities. The relationship had to remain less than official, however; otherwise, by their subordination to the brigade, Task Force Lonestar advisors would have fallen under federal control and therefore would have had to operate under Title 10. One may question if this arrangement circumvented the intent of the U.S. federal law; however, the reserve battalion was deployed to assist in the Algiers district, not specifically to police it. The spirit of this workaround was therefore constructive, preserving both the letter and the intent of the Posse Commitatus Act. That is to say, it was not done cynically in some effort to override operational inconveniences imposed by the Constitution.

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Additionally, the brigade was frustrated by the numerous overlapping areas of responsibility and autonomous chains of command of National Guard logistics and tactical units, federal aid and law enforcement agencies, and NGOs. Coordination across parish boundaries was difficult enough, but dual military chains of command separating Title 10 and Title 32 Soldiers complicated relief operations. Moreover, although FEMA proved willing to provide supplies, it was incapable of delivering or securing them on site. In the future, some provision for establishing a single chain of command that subordinates active-component forces to Title 32 forces should be available. Such an arrangement would allow unity of command, and Title 32 units could maintain their law enforcement capabilities. The Title 10 troops could then more easily and efficiently coordinate and deliver relief supplies to those in need.

Finally, 2d Brigade's troops, and especially its leaders, were grossly unprepared for the civil government-law enforcement dynamics and culture of New Orleans. Even in the United States, most military troops live in isolated, almost exclusively military communities. In such communities, junior leaders and noncommissioned officers, who are often ostensibly in a middle or lower-middle socioeconomic class, enjoy a typically low-crime work and home environment that is comparatively free of racial tensions. Army officers, noncommissioned officers, and junior enlisted Soldiers were ill prepared for the obvious socioeconomic and racial discrimination in post-Katrina New Orleans. Long after shotgun-toting NOPD officers turned back hurricane-displaced, and predominantly inner-city, minorities from the safer, drier areas of New Orleans's mostly white suburbs, Soldiers found local law enforcement and parish government leaders shockingly unwilling to help Algiers citizens. It was clear to Soldiers that these residents were discriminated against simply because of the color of their skin. Neighboring Jefferson Parish police blocked off roads connecting the mostly black Algiers area from the mostly white Jefferson Parish area. They refused Algiers residents access to still-open stores, hospitals, and aid stations in the suburb. Those in obvious need and seeking necessary goods and services were turned back, regardless of their situation. After frequent substantiated complaints to Soldiers from the people of Algiers, brigade troops began to transport those in need through the roadblocks in HMMWVs. And, despite Soldiers having alerted the 4th District NOPD to many crimes in progress, its officers often chose to ignore calls for help. This attitude was especially true when the crimes were occurring in the depressed Fischer Projects. Frequently, 2d Brigade Soldiers and leaders were stopped and thanked by residents who stated that they would not seek help from the NOPD because its officers were "worse than the criminals." These people claimed that if they needed help, they would contact the nearest Soldier. Of the many law enforcement agencies 2d Brigade operated with in Algiers, only the local NOPD posed these challenges. In fact, the brigade operated closely with and developed a high regard for the professionalism of New Orleans SWAT, the Sheriff's Department, Immigration and Customs Enforcement, and the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms. These agencies worked tirelessly to establish security and respond to crises throughout the recovery effort.