Will the Army ever learn good media relations techniques? Walter Reed as a case study

Military Review, May-June, 2008 by James T. Currie

Three days after the Post's initial story, the news got worse for the Army. On Wednesday, 21 February, the Post ran an editorial addressing problems at Walter Reed. Titled "Rotten Homecoming," the editorial skewered the Army for the "bureaucratic contempt and physical squalor that too often await badly injured outpatient Soldiers" at Walter Reed. It also cited Weightman's pledge that "conditions on the post will improve rapidly," calling the Walter Reed commander's response "commendable." (16)

I should interject here that, of all the high-level Army officials involved in this story, only Weightman seems to have understood how to deal with the press on a series of negative stories like these. Unfortunately, he became the first designated fall guy for the problems at Walter Reed--even though he had apparently begun to clean up the mess he found when he took over the command in August 2006. (17)

The same two reporters who wrote the initial story and its Monday follow-up (Priest and Hull) had another piece in the newspaper that same day. "Top Army officials yesterday visited Building 18 ...," the reporters wrote. "Army Secretary Francis Harvey and Vice Chief of Staff Richard Cody toured the building and spoke to Soldiers as workers in protective masks stripped mold from the walls and tore up soiled carpets." Weightman was quoted as saying that "all of the staff increases he had requested would be met." Army Secretary Harvey was also quoted on the causes of the problems at Walter Reed: "It's a failure ... in the garrison leadership ... that should have never happened, and we are quickly going to rectify that situation." (18) It was clear that the search for a scapegoat had begun, but at least people at high levels in the Army were beginning to acknowledge that there were problems at WRAMC.

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By Thursday, Army Surgeon General Kevin Kiley felt that the situation at Walter Reed was under control. In what was clearly the beginning of his problems in dealing with the public relations disaster, Kiley offered his thoughts at a news conference on the grounds of the medical facility. Referring to the building the Post had identified as filled with "mouse droppings, belly-up cockroaches, and stained carpets," he told assembled reporters, "I do not consider Building 18 to be substandard." Minimizing the conditions at Walter Reed and ignoring the systemic problems identified in the Post's stories and addressed by his subordinate, Weightman, Kiley reported, "We frankly fixed all of those problems." (19) In making such statements, Kiley violated another of the key rules in addressing a public relations disaster: don't try to deny the obvious. If high-ranking officials did not see mouse droppings and mold-encrusted walls as a problem at a medical facility, then, the Army is in worse shape than anyone thought.

Kiley then offered a theme of detachment that proved all too revealing and eventually led to his downfall. In doing so, he provided another example of how not to address real problems. Referring to the Post's stories as "one-sided representation," he defended the conditions in Building 18, saying, "This is not a horrific, catastrophic failure at Walter Reed." (20) The "one-sided representation" comment is what stands out. One wonders what he thought the other side of the story was. Was he thinking it would excuse the situation if some rooms in the building did not have mold, or rodents, or dead cockroaches? This theme would surface again.