Doctrine for asymmetric warfare

Military Review, July-August, 2003 by Clinton J. Ancker, III, Michael D. Burke

ANY DISCUSSION of doctrine and asymmetry must begin by acknowledging the tension inherent between the role of doctrine and the nature of asymmetry in warfare. Doctrine should succinctly express the collective wisdom about how U.S. Armed Forces conduct military operations. In 1923, historian J.F.C. Fuller wrote that "the central idea of an army is known as its doctrine, which to be sound must be principles of war, and which to be effective must be elastic enough to admit of mutation in accordance with change in circumstance. In its ultimate relationship to the human understanding this central idea or doctrine is nothing else than common sense--that is, action adapted to circumstance." (1)

While asymmetric warfare encompasses a wide scope of theory, experience, conjecture, and definition, the implicit premise is that asymmetric warfare deals with unknowns, with surprise in terms of ends, ways, and means. The more dissimilar the opponent, the more difficult it is to anticipate his actions. If we knew in advance how an opponent planned to exploit our dissimilarities, we could develop specific doctrine to counter his actions. Against asymmetric opponents, doctrine should provide a way to think about asymmetry and an operational philosophy that would take asymmetry fully into account.

One way to look at asymmetric warfare is to see it as a classic action-reaction-counteraction cycle. Our enemies study our doctrine and try to counter it. Any competent enemy will do the unexpected, if he believes it will work. When we understand the asymmetry, we counter it, and so forth. For example, if a potential opponent has biological weapons and the United States does not, our preparation occurs across a technological, doctrinal, and operational range in terms of force protection, development of antidotes, and the ability to attack or defeat the enemy's delivery means, civil support, and so on. Such preparation serves to deter the use of biological weapons, because the opponent's original asymmetric advantage has been reduced.

Unfortunately, uncertainty is inseparable from the nature of warfare, and asymmetry increases uncertainty. Those who expect doctrine and tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) to provide solutions and checklists for action are soon disabused of that notion during actual operations. If and when the enemy surprises us with a capability, our response is necessarily ad hoc and less effective. Depending on our preconceptions and ability to adapt, the advantage an opponent enjoys might persist. Doctrine must prepare the military force with a mindset to deal with uncertainty quickly and effectively. The Japanese navy's Long Lance torpedo illustrates our failure to deal with an asymmetric threat.

Japan's Long Lance Torpedo

In the years between World War I and World War II, the U.S. and Japanese navies pursued different technical and tactical solutions to naval surface combat. The U.S. Navy focused on very long-range daylight gunnery, supported by seaplane spotters and sophisticated analog computers. (2) For the computers to calculate a firing solution, the firing ship had to maintain a steady course to allow the computer to "settle down" and provide accurate data to the turrets.

The Japanese Navy developed the Type 93 Long Lance torpedo that carded a large warhead and could travel 20,000 yards or more at speeds of up to 45 knots. (3) The Japanese had an ideal fire-and-forget system. In consequence, the Japanese trained to fight at night, with radically maneuvering destroyers and cruisers that fired torpedoes.

For more than 2 years after the U.S. Navy encountered the Long Lance in early 1942, it did not appreciate the weapon's capabilities. The two navies had proceeded down different asymmetric paths, and U.S. torpedo development had many shortcomings. U.S. torpedoes were quite slow, carried a smaller warhead, had a range of less than 10,000 yards, and often failed to explode even when striking a target. In consequence, the U.S. Navy projected its poor capabilities onto those of the opponent's and refused to believe that the Japanese could deploy a superior torpedo. Eventually, U.S. air power, radar-directed gunfire, and other tactical adaptations restored some balance, but throughout the war, the Japanese torpedo baffled Navy planners. The U.S. Navy suffered an asymmetric technological and tactical surprise. Because we did not anticipate the weapon and, indeed, could not accept that the Japanese had it, we had no easy answers, and it took years to adapt.

Developing U.S. Doctrine

To get beyond the tension inherent between asymmetry and doctrine, our focus is on two observations about asymmetry that to many of our potential opponents we are highly relevant to the development of U.S. doctrine. The first is the requirement to understand that to many of our potential opponents we appear to be as asymmetric as they appear to be to us. To the al-Qaeda fighter, cowering in a cave in a remote part of Afghanistan, fuel air explosives, dropped with deadly precision from aircraft miles away and thousands of feet up, directed by laser designators wielded by highly trained and stealthy special operation forces (SOF), is as asymmetric to him as his tactics are to us. The second point is that doctrine cannot predict the nature and form of asymmetric conflicts, but it can forecast the necessary traits and body of conceptual knowledge necessary to cope with a chaotic asymmetric operational environment.