Precision firepower: smart bombs, dumb strategy

Military Review, July-August, 2003 by Timothy R. Reese

Precision firepower theory also encourages U.S. strategists to overreach in achieving strategic objectives. In the late 20th century, the United States often demanded concessions from wounded but not defeated enemies--concessions that were far out of proportion to the military situation on the ground. Regime punishment all too easily becomes regime change in the overheated rhetoric that characterizes U.S. foreign policymaking. Conversely, situations in Panama and Grenada were quickly resolved using a combination of precision firepower in support of landpower. It is instructive to remember what surrender and military occupation can achieve.

In the 1999 bombing of Serbia, NATO leaders and U.S. President William Clinton were convinced that only a few days of air strikes against fixed Serbian targets would persuade Milosevic to end the ethnic cleansing in Kosovo. After 78 days of bombing, immense destruction of Serbian infrastructure, and months of intensified ethnic cleansing, NATO and Clinton were forced to consider a ground invasion to resolve the conflict. Some believe that air support for the Kosovo Liberation Army's ground operations plus the threat of a ground invasion finally convinced Milosevic to agree to an armistice. Other studies conclude that Milosevic agreed to an armistice only when he concluded that NATO was about to annihilate Serbia's economic and civilian infrastructure. (28) Whatever the reason, 25,000 plus NATO ground troops were needed to enforce the terms of the armistice. NATO troops are still in Serbia, and no political solution that would allow NATO's withdrawal is in sight. The alleged success of the bombing campaign locked NATO into a strategic conundrum.

The United States should ensure that its strategic objectives are commensurate with the military victories U.S. Armed Forces have won. If the objective is merely to destroy some particular capability of another state, then precision firepower alone might be successful. We must not, however, expect that our relatively cheap, quick, and easy military victories will somehow bring about long-lasting peace, stability, and support for U.S. strategic objectives. Such grandiose expectation will only make disappointment that much more intense.

The Problem of Ends in War

Assume that we can sweep aside all the limitations on precision firepower's effectiveness. Assume that the United States' weapons cupboards are overflowing, that the terrain and weather favor us, that the enemy is militarily incompetent, and that we have addressed moral considerations to everyone's satisfaction. Smart bombs and Information-Age wonder weapons prove decisive at the tactical and operational levels of war. The fact is that even in such an idyllic world, precision firepower will come up short because even when the weapons work, the theory cannot deliver victory.

Precision firepower theory's critical shortcoming is that it cannot achieve strategic objectives on its own. Precision air strikes might persuade an enemy to sue for an armistice, but it cannot compel him to alter his behavior once strikes cease. When attacked only by firepower, the enemy determines whether or not to submit and how faithfully he will adhere to proffered terms. A political resolution to war that requires an enemy to make fundamental changes to his foreign or domestic policies is possible only through the decisive application of firepower and landpower. Only when the victor brings his ground forces to bear to make even passive resistance impossible can he impose his will on the enemy. Even when precision firepower is decisively important in the conduct of a campaign, only ground forces are capable of ensuring lasting victory.