Precision firepower: smart bombs, dumb strategy

Military Review, July-August, 2003 by Timothy R. Reese

The essential question regarding the use of military force is not how to most effectively apply the military means at hand (tactics and operations) but rather, how to use military means to "fulfill the ends of policy." (29) War by precision firepower can all too easily become killing without purpose. There is no single-dimensional military solution to winning the peace.

War is a political act; it might have its own grammar, but it does not have its own logic. Clausewitz reminds us that the "superiority one has or gains in war is only the means and not the end; it must be risked for the sake of the end." (30) Current U.S. joint doctrine agrees with Clausewitz, cautioning that "wars are fought for political goals. Wars are successful only when political goals are achieved and these goals endure" [emphasis in original]. (31)

Warden has Clausewitz wrong when he says that the physical aspect of an opponent's power to resist can be separated from his will to resist. Both must be defeated to achieve one's ends in war. Clausewitz is instructive here on the need to render an opponent permanently helpless: "If our opponent is to be coerced you must put him in a situation that is more oppressive than the sacrifice you call on him to make. The hardship of that situation must not be of course merely transitory--at least in appearance. Otherwise the enemy would not give in but would wait for things to improve.... The worst of all conditions in which a belligerent can find himself is to be utterly defenseless." (32)

U.S. Army doctrine, in line with joint doctrine and Clausewitz, states the following about achieving victory in war: "With their inherent qualities of on-the-ground presence and situational understanding, Army forces make permanent the otherwise temporary effects of fires alone. Domination that extends from the certainty in the minds of enemy commanders that close combat with Army forces, backed by superlative U.S. air and naval forces, will have two outcomes: destruction or surrender." (33)

Recent opponents have shown great skill at ending U.S. bombing strikes by agreeing to a limited set of cease-fire terms, only then to flout those terms after the attacks cease. (34) Turning military successes into lasting political settlements is the formidable challenge of military strategy that precision firepower theory does not answer.

Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan offers some glimpses into this dilemma. Initially the United States announced the limited aim of destroying the al-Qaeda organization. The Taliban had to be destroyed only because it harbored members of al-Qaeda and refused to turn them over to the United States. But it is clear that the United States also desired that Afghanistan cease being a breeding ground for terrorism and to join the community of peaceful nations. The U.S. toppled the Taliban using air strikes in support of a large ground army from the Northern Alliance. Still, the United States does not control events on the ground. U.S. foreign policy leaders are still searching for a way to prevent Afghanistan from sliding back into anarchy. (35)