Guerrillas, terrorists, and intelligence analysis: something old, something new

Military Review, July-August, 2004 by Lester W. Grau

Geographic profiling, a police technique that combines spatial analysis and psychological behavior patterns of criminals, looks at such factors as distance to the crime, demographics, landscape analysis, pattern analysis, crime scene forensic analysis, and psychological criminal profiling. Ambushes, raids, IED and mortar attacks, sniping attacks, and other guerrilla actions are complex serial crimes. Police can use geographic profiling to identify separate groups or group members, provide theoretical profiles, determine likely residences or likely attack times, routes, and tactics.

Property ownership and mapping, also a valuable tool in counterinsurgency, can identify community power brokers, vested interests, and family connections. Financial transactions, cell phone transmissions, and travel patterns can also provide valuable data to intelligence analysts. Finding the guerrilla is a function of detective work. Who is he? Who does he work with? Who are members of his family, and where do they live? What is his background? Who are his associates?

Extensive data files are a boring but necessary part of finding the guerrilla. However, computer data-mining can ease the job considerably by providing assistance in incident (crime scene) analysis, optimum force deployment, risk assessment, behavioral analysis, DNA analysis, force protection, and internet and infrastructure protection. (6) All the tools of police investigation are relevant. Technology makes it easier, but a lot of old-fashioned footwork and analysis is still required. Military lawyers and the supporting psychological operations (PSYOP) and civil affairs units should be briefed regularly and visited to prevent incidents and turf issues.

The 4th Infantry Division (ID) captured Saddam Hussein based on intelligence developed from link-pattern analysis. The 4th ID is the most modernized, digitized, and computerized division in the Army, yet intelligence personnel who did the link-pattern analysis did it the tedious, old-fashioned way, using pads of butcher-board paper, yellow stickles, and a large wall chart. (7) Some dedicated intelligence personnel did a brilliant job, but time and energy could have been greatly reduced with current software applications and computerized databases.

Intelligence in a counterinsurgency needs a national computerized database that can be readily shared by the police and coalition military. Doing this requires uniformity in software and procedures. The database should also have a reach-back capability. A database is only as good as its data, so standard forms for felony tracking and debriefing are essential. The database should allow ready access to gang intelligence, crime/event mapping, modus operandi, and routine data such as property ownership, and telephone and financial records. Existing databases, such as those of the National Agency Center, National Criminal Investigation Service, and even LexisNexis, a commercial database for legal and other research, could serve as models.