Persuasion and coercion in counterinsurgency warfare

Military Review, July-August, 2008 by Andrew J. Birtle

From the start of America's involvement in Vietnam, U.S. Soldiers preached political action as a key ingredient in the counterinsurgency effort. For example, in 1954, Army Chief of Staff General Matthew B. Ridgway recommended that a precondition for giving military assistance to Vietnam should be the existence of "a reasonably strong, stable, civil government in control," because "it is hopeless to expect a U.S. military training mission to achieve success unless the nation concerned is able to effectively perform governmental functions." (15) The following year, the senior U.S. military representative in South Vietnam, Lieutenant General Samuel T. Williams, cautioned Vietnam's leaders that "military operations alone are not sufficient for success," and that military actions must be conducted "in harmony with ... political, psychological, and economic policies." (16) Every top U.S. commander in Vietnam after Williams reiterated this advice. Together with U.S. diplomatic personnel, American Soldiers also pressed the Vietnamese to make socioeconomic, political, and administrative reforms to strengthen the government's standing with the population and to undermine support for the insurgents. These principles, however, proved easier to understand than to execute, given the complexities of American bureaucracy, Vietnamese politics, and the enemy's political and military strength. Meanwhile, the United States took what unilateral actions it could, pouring millions of dollars into a wide variety of aid and development programs and performing innumerable civic actions, from providing free medical care to building schools and digging wells.

As in previous wars, these actions had positive effects, but they could not win the conflict. Poor conception, flawed execution, bureaucratic wrangling, resource shortages, and various other political impediments contributed to the disappointing result. Just as important, however, was the fact that the United States had formed unrealistic expectations about what political action could achieve given the conditions in Vietnam. In the words of one 1966 Army report--

   Socioeconomic programs must be closely
   tied to the pace of the security effort.
   Attempts to win allegiance from the population
   or to induce from it a willingness to
   bear arms against Viet Cong harassment by
   the distribution of commodities or services
   without reasonable assurance of continued
   physical security are invitations to failure.
   An early U.S. assistance concept espoused
   socio-economic good works which, by
   themselves and preceding security, were
   expected to galvanize the peasant into
   making a military commitment against
   the Viet Cong. Programs executed under
   this concept were dramatically unsuccessful:
   bags of bulgur wheat have never been
   known to kill an insurgent. (17)

Americans rediscovered in Vietnam what their forbearers had learned in the War of the Rebellion and the Philippine War, and what Army doctrine had foretold--that political and military measures were equally necessary and that they had to be carefully coordinated to have a positive effect. Furthermore, until the security forces could protect people from insurgent intimidation and control, little of significance could be expected from political programs designed to wean the population from the insurgency. Should the government gain the upper hand militarily, demonstrations of benevolence could indeed persuade guerrillas to surrender and civilians to openly side with the apparent victors. As in the American South and the Philippines, therefore, successful applications of military force and restrictive measures would be essential for success. Given that by 1966 the enemy had approximately a quarter of a million troops, guerrillas, and cadre in and around South Vietnam, allied forces faced the daunting task of keeping the enemy in check while providing the sort of security necessary to persuade people either to support the government or to stop aiding the enemy.