Persuasion and coercion in counterinsurgency warfare

Military Review, July-August, 2008 by Andrew J. Birtle

This truth notwithstanding, individuals writing about counterinsurgency warfare most emphasize the unusual degree to which political considerations permeate what in conventional conflicts would be purely administrative, technical, or military decisions. This is understandable, but it can become counterproductive when taken to extremes. All too often, people reduce counterinsurgency's complex nature to slogans declaring that political considerations are primary, that nation building is a viable war-winning strategy, and that the only road to victory is to win the "hearts and minds" of a population. As with many cliches, these promote one truth at the expense of another.

There are several reasons why such slogans tend to obscure more than they illuminate. To begin with, simplistic catch phrases do not convey the reality that some political differences are irreconcilable--which, of course, may be why the parties to a dispute have resorted to arms in the first place. Neither do such phrases help policymakers navigate the labyrinth of political considerations incumbent in any internal conflict. Just as political and military concerns will sometimes clash, so too will choices have to be made between competing political imperatives.

Slogans such as "winning hearts and minds" can also lead to a misapprehension that counterinsurgencies are popularity contests. Sometimes unpopular actions such as the Army's relocation of civilians during the Philippine War may be necessary. In the same way, worthy actions such as the liberation of a previously repressed class may fan the flames of resistance among a nation's traditional elite, while promoting democratic reforms, as the United States did in Vietnam, can backfire by increasing instability.

Moreover, cliches meant to illuminate the importance of politics can build unrealistic expectations within the American public that only serve to thwart the government's ability to resolve insurgencies successfully. There is a tendency on the part of many Americans, for example, to believe that economic capitalism and political democracy are sure remedies for resolving internal conflicts. This belief, a reflection of our culture, has always been present, but it gained particular virulence in the 1960s when nation building and counterinsurgency theorist Walt W. Rostow postulated that a thirst for a more prosperous life had created a "revolution of rising expectations" that was driving people to rebel in less prosperous areas of the world. (20) Ambassador Ellsworth Bunker reflected this philosophy when he told South Vietnamese Prime Minister Nguyen Cao Ky that "people are drifting toward communism because they are poor. If you give the people everything they want--television sets, automobiles, and so on--none of them will go over to communism." (21) The rhetoric proved naive. Economics and materialism were not as deterministic as many had thought, and even Rostow eventually admitted that "as for the linkage between economic is development and the emergence of stable political democracies, we may, in retrospect, have been a bit too hopeful." (22)