Legitimacy and military operations: the views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the U.S. Government, the Department of Defense, or any of its agencies

Military Review, July-August, 2008 by James W. Hammond

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Perceptions and legitimacy. The fourth aspect of legitimacy that military commanders must understand is that the legitimacy is relative to the audience. For example, a military force operating in Iraq must primarily be concerned about the local Iraqi population's perception of Iraqi government legitimacy. The less legitimate an operation seems, the less support it can expect. If the people regard it as legitimate, a U.S.-led operation to track an IED cell that killed hundreds of civilians can elicit local assistance. On the other hand, the people may regard a cordon-and-search operation in an area where insurgents have harmed few locals as unnecessary and less legitimate. In the same vein, the international community will be less supportive of actions deemed arbitrary, if the force has intervened illegitimately in a territory or conducted overly aggressive operations. In addition, the domestic audience is also critical to success, as the United States learned during the Vietnam era. Once the people viewed that war as illegitimate back at home, the likelihood of a successful conclusion to it became more remote. Finally, the men and women of the deployed military force make up an important audience that questions the force's legitimacy as rigorously as any other audience does. Once the mission loses legitimacy in their eyes, whether due to immoral or excessive action, regaining effectiveness will take a complete overhaul of trust, which may well be impossible. Forced obedience in such circumstances will never compensate for willing obedience lost with squandered legitimacy.

Contested legitimacy. A final characteristic of legitimacy is that it applies to both sides in a conflict. Often, coalition officers will point out that the enemy targets innocent civilians, tortures and beheads hostages, and refuses to observe any rules of combat. We know from experience that all of this is true, but we must also consider whether such conduct is an effective strategy for the enemy in the long run. General David H. Petraeus notes, "Al-Qaeda's indiscriminate attacks ... have finally started to turn a substantial proportion of the Iraqi population against it." (19) James Fallows adds: "What they have done is to follow the terrorist's logic of steadily escalating the degree of carnage and violence--which has meant violating the guerrilla warrior's logic of bringing the civilian population to your side ... [I]nsurgents have slaughtered civilians daily ... But since American troops are also assumed to be killing civilians, the anti-insurgent backlash is muddied." 20

Al-Qaeda leaders at the highest levels recognize the negative impact of violence on their strategy. According to Peter Bergen, "It was Al-Zawahin who wrote a letter to Al-Qaeda's leader in Iraq, Abu Mousab Al-Zargawi, gently suggesting that he stop his habit of beheading hostages because it was turning off many Muslims." (21) Similar negative responses occurred in the fall of 2005 after bombs exploded in Amman, Jordan, and in Bali, Indonesia. In the day-to-day struggle for legitimacy, both insurgents and counterinsurgents wrestle on the fulcrum of the relationship between force and legitimacy.