Decision navigation: coping with 21st-century challenges in tactical decisionmaking

Military Review, Sept-Oct, 2003 by Dennis T. Gyllensporre

Grant's modified plan was for troops to continue the advance 10 miles further south so the gunboats could land the four divisions unopposed on the east bank at Bruinsburg, Mississippi. At the time, the landing was the largest amphibious operation in U.S. history. Contrary to orders, Grant continued to advance eastward to Port Gibson, Mississippi, without the planned support from Banks whose force had again been delayed. (80)

The plan now outlined a march northeast to Edwards Station, Mississippi, which is between Vicksburg and Jackson. By controlling the railroad, Grant believed he would gain a marked advantage by cutting Pemberton's communications. The risks were obvious. The Union force would be located between Pemberton's force and potential Confederate reinforcements from Jackson and would have long, vulnerable lines of communications. Starting with the battle of Port Gibson (in a 17-day period of 200 miles of marches and 5 battles) Grant maneuvered his force within sight of the defenses on the eastern outskirts of the city. (81) This part of the campaign is often referred to as the blitzkrieg of the Vicksburg Campaign. (82) Grant, incrementally adjusting his plans of advance based on the enemy's positions, including Pemberton's army east of Vicksburg and Confederate General Joseph E. Johnston's troops at Jackson, defeated the Confederate forces piecemeal. After more than a month of siege warfare, Pemberton surrendered to Grant on 4 July 1863.

Despite all hardships, Grant kept committed to the end state. He quickly identified when a plan became obsolete and made many changes as the campaign unfolded. Ready to exploit windows of opportunity (like Ross's success), his focus was on the immediate phase. Continuous adjustments and refinements of the plan made Grant a successful decision navigator. Once committed in an area where he did not have sufficient situation awareness (as during Sherman's first attack at Vicksburg), Grant distributed the problems of uncertainty and complexity by providing an intent and by empowering corps commanders to operate based on their own judgment. His bold move to continue without Banks's support and to attack to cut off Pemberton east of Vicksburg stands out as a crucial decision based on intuition.

Decision Navigation: The Way Ahead

The future battlefield environment will be highly complex, dynamic, and uncertain, and the requirements of force protection will increase. More than ever before, the leader is the focal point for conflicting interests. He must balance the need for fast--and accurate--decisions in a more demanding environment. The changing environment calls for a new paradigm for the next generation of warfare.

The new paradigm, moving beyond Newton's majestic clockwork metaphor, guides us to a new way of approaching decisionmaking. By accepting complexity, uncertainty, and tactical dynamics as natural ingredients in decisionmaking, the post-Newtonian paradigm shows that commanders must act incrementally and use intuition to develop satisficing decisions. The concept of decision navigation captures the new mindset. Tactical decision-making should use its four key principles to--