Decision navigation: coping with 21st-century challenges in tactical decisionmaking

Military Review, Sept-Oct, 2003 by Dennis T. Gyllensporre

New systems based on advanced technology and refined procedures increase specialization. The number of military occupational specialties in tactical units is steadily growing. (27) Complex and abstract systems increase the number of options for the commander, but also make the effect of decisions more difficult to anticipate. The Newtonian mindset attacks complexity by reductionist analysis; problems are broken down into manageable pieces. If the commander has less information than he needs, the unit might increase information processing and use multiple communications channels. But, this approach increases the size and complexity of the staff and is, therefore, inadequate. (28) Instead, simplifying the organization so that it operates with less information might increase command performance.

When confronted with insufficient information, the commander might react by adjusting either the organization or the mission in order to operate successfully with less information. (29) He organizes units to work semi-independently and distributes uncertainty and decisions to subordinates.

Tempo is the rate of speed of battles and engagements. By controlling tempo, the commander can gain and sustain the initiative. Increased tempo calls for faster movement of troops, faster destruction of the enemy, and an increased capability to transition to subsequent phases or adopt branches or sequels. (30) From a decisionmaking perspective, the commander increases tempo by compressing the decisionmaking process or reducing the number of decisions.

To limit the number of decisions the commander and staff must make, subordinates must have the authority to make decisions. The organization should be as self-contained as possible, minimizing requirements for coordination. However, the leap in communications technology embodied in Force XXI links the highest and lowest levels of command, implying a risk that senior leaders might micromanage. (31) Skipping command levels increases the tempo of decisions, but it soon overloads the commander with uncertainty and complexity.

Security includes protection of friendly forces and mitigation of tactical risks. The public currently accepts or tolerates few casualties and tactical failures. The images of surgical warfare introduced during Operation Desert Storm and further enhanced during Operation Enduring Freedom and Operation Iraqi Freedom have nourished this view. Thus, the risks associated with, for example, soldiers not complying with the rules of engagement or incurring a significant number of heat causalities might have strategic ramifications. This could tempt a commander to instill tight control mechanisms, detailed guidance, and authorization requirements for some actions in order to limit subordinates' risks. After all, the commander has the ultimate responsibility. However, security does not necessarily imply tight control or centralized command.

Safety engineering and organizational research indicate that complex systems should be decentralized. Tightly coupled organizations--those in which different parts of the organization greatly depend on each other--are less prone to errors if they are centralized; loosely coupled organizations are best decentralized. Since tightly coupled complex systems are also prone to errors, complex organizations should be loosely coupled for the best risk management. (32)