Maritime and expeditionary dominance: Great Britain's legacy to 21st-century strategy

Military Review, Sept-Oct, 2003 by John Trost Kuehn

OPERATIONS Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom underscore America's reputation as the world's most powerful, influential maritime power. Guaranteed access "from the sea" and "sovereign power forward" provides a critical capability, even in the campaign in landlocked, mountainous Afghanistan. (1)

More than 200 years ago the world began to accelerate exponentially because of developments wrought by the scientific and industrial revolutions. At that time, Great Britain and Napoleonic-era France were locked in a life-or-death struggle. That mere water could so frustrate his genius in his 20-year struggle with the British Empire infuriated Napoleon: "With 30,000 men in transports the English ... can paralyze 300,000 of my Army, and that will reduce us to a second-class power." (2)

Great Britain's power was based principally on a marriage of maritime power with effective diplomacy. After Napoleon's defeat, the world entered a period of peace with Great Britain as the global leader. The United States is the direct heir to Great Britain's mantle of maritime power and global leadership. (3)

The efficacy of sea power and the utility of the concept of command of the sea are vital topics for debate. (4) Alfred T. Mahan's famous 19th-century case study on Great Britain's rise as the dominant maritime power of the 18th and 19th centuries calls for a long-overdue return to the roots of the U.S. Navy. (5) Also on the hot-topic list is the debate regarding the advantages and vulnerabilities of working within the framework of multinational coalitions. (6) A synthesis of the themes--maritime dominance and coalition challenges--reveals a link. Maritime dominance, when examined from the historical precedent Great Britain set, supplies the methods that might help solve some of the challenges of 21st-century coalition warfare.

The debate leads to the question, "Is a military security strategy based primarily around expeditionary/maritime power-projection better suited to the United States as it advances into the 21st century?" Obviously, it is too late to decide if this strategy is appropriate for today's needs. The United States must fight current conflicts with the tools at hand, tools that were crafted to fight the Cold War.

Maritime-Based Strategy

The historical precedent for adopting a maritime-based strategy is essentially the same today as it was in Mahan's day; that is, it follows Great Britain's example. In the last 20 years of the 19th century, U.S. political and military leaders faced a rapidly destabilizing world. Strategic decisions, based in part on Mahan's influence, led to the U.S. Navy's expansion, resulting in a world-class navy that paid handsome dividends during two world wars and the Cold War.

Great Britain's example is no less relevant today than 100 years ago. Britain, which coupled a flair for coalition warfare with a sustained strategy of maritime dominance, refined a policy that combined aggressive economic policies, maritime dominance, and fighting continental opponents by proxy within coalitions. These are the same methods coalition forces are using in Afghanistan and, to a lesser degree, in Iraq. The British used this method to build a force structure around a large, vigorous Navy and a small (by continental standards), but highly professional, expeditionary army.

When Napoleon posed the most significant threat to its security, Britain defeated him. For over 200 years, British decisionmakers refined the Nation's strategy and in the process maintained the continental (and from a European viewpoint, global) balance of power. Until the 20th century, no other modern Western power had equaled this skillful combination of maritime dominance and coalition warfare to maintain and advance national interests. As it supplanted the British as the leader of the Western world, the United States has subtly and oftentimes uncomfortably borne the mantle of this method.

Important lessons are inherent in this model. British strategy, executed over the long term, proved remarkably flexible in meeting needs during periods of relative peace and during a sustained global conflict with France; in other words, across the spectrum of conflict. The essential elements of power remained the same without a radical shift in strategy or force structure. Forty years after Waterloo, this same strategy enabled Great Britain to join in a coalition with France against Russia in the Crimean War. A similar approach might provide the United States the same long-term benefits.

Coalitions and Maritime Dominance

Particularly germane to America's current situation is how a strategy of maritime dominance proved the most flexible combination when it became necessary for Great Britain to become involved in a multitude of coalitions. For the United States, doctrine and National Security Strategy emphasize that overseas military operations will often occur within the framework of a coalition. (7) Britain was able to pick and choose coalition partners precisely because its island geography and powerful Navy allowed the flexibility to withdraw, refocus effort, or both. Continental opponents invariably found their colonies gobbled up or threatened; their seaward flanks threatened and invaded; and new land armies raised phoenix-like, all because of Britain's overwhelming maritime, expeditionary, and economic dominance. When a truly formidable opponent attempted to fight Britain with a military or economic coalition, such as Napoleon's Continental System, the strategy failed because its enforcement could only be achieved through naval supremacy. Nevertheless, six coalition combinations were necessary before Napoleon was ultimately defeated. (8) One might question the efficacy of coalitions, given the number of iterations it took to gain victory in this case. However, "good strategy is never quick but must work to influence events over time." (9) This is precisely the point historian and strategist Sir Julian S. Corbett made, that Mahan implied, and that recent dialogues on long-term U.S. strategy reaffirmed. Napoleon's defeat was the result of a coalition of continental allies.