Controlling Non-Strategic Nuclear Weapons: Obstacles and Opportunities

Military Review, Sept-Oct, 2003 by Erick D. McCroskey

Jeffrey A. Larsen and Kurt J. Klingenberger, eds., The USAF Institute for National Security Studies, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, DC, 2001, 356 pages. Out of print.

This compendium of 13 articles is an attempt to bring together a summary on nonstrategic nuclear weapons (NSNW) as discussed at the November 2000 Airlie Conference in Warrenton, Virginia. Because of its format and the varying views 75 experts expressed in regard to arms control, nuclear weapons, and national-security strategy, the book contains some healthy academic disagreement and does not attempt to provide an overarching theme. The foreword states quite clearly, that "the important point is that Russia at any time might choose to leave a dead-end of its own making. Foreseeing that time and being ready for it is the purpose of this unique book."

To organize material encompassing such a complicated subject, the editors assigned each article to one of four different sections: "Defining the NSNW Problem," "Contending Objectives," "Obstacles," and "Possible Solutions." This approach works to a limited extent. However, there is a significant amount of redundancy between articles, and the articles within the sections often do not fulfill the promise of section titles. Perhaps most illustrative of this is the section on Possible Solutions. If readers expect to find even a hint of a clear-cut strategy, they will be sorely disappointed. This is not the fault of the contributors, however; as one of them states, "One of the biggest myths in Washington is that the ability to identify a problem proves there must be a solution. This case is an example of that myth: the solution of a traditional arms control arrangement might seem attractive, but it is unlikely to solve the problem of Russian nonstrategic nuclear weapons. Some things really are too hard."

If the subject is so complex as to preclude pat conclusions, and if readers feel unsatisfied after completing the book, why should they read it? One answer, found in the conclusion, is that readers will encounter a range and depth of thinking not found elsewhere in security-policy formulation literature. The foreword provides another answer: "For fifty years nonstrategic nuclear weapons have been the main source of the crises, accidents, and diplomatic contretemps associated with weapons of mass destruction ...." It behooves military professionals and civilian policymakers to delve more deeply into what could be the crucial focus of disarmament in the future.

The book serves as a valuable reference. Not only do the articles eloquently summarize the topic's salient points, the appendixes cover primary documents and initiatives from 1983 to the present that form the environment for NSNW negotiations.

MAJ Erick D. McCroskey, USAF, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas