Winning the war of the flea: lessons from guerrilla warfare

Military Review, Sept-Oct, 2004 by Robert M. Cassidy

For much of the Vietnam war, the 5th SF Group trained and led CIDG mobile strike forces and reconnaissance companies manned by indigenous ethnic minority tribes from mountain and border regions. These forces conducted small-unit reconnaissance patrols and defended their home bases in the border areas from Viet Cong (VC) and regular North Vietnamese Army (NVA) units.

From 1966 to 1967, U.S. field commanders increasingly employed SF-led units in long-range reconnaissance missions or as economy-of-force security elements for regular units. Other CIDG-type forces, called mobile guerrilla forces, raided enemy base areas and employed hit-and-run guerrilla tactics against regular enemy units. The SF also recruited extensively among Nung tribes for the Delta, Sigma, and Omega units, which were SF-led reconnaissance and reaction forces.

The CIDG program made a significant contribution to the war effort. The approximately 2,500 soldiers assigned to the 5th SF Group essentially raised and led an army of 50,000 tribal fighters to operate in some of the most difficult and dangerous terrain in Vietnam. CIDG patrols of border infiltration areas provided reliable tactical intelligence, and the CIDG secured populations in areas that might have been otherwise conceded to the enemy. (15)

The Marine Corps' CAP was another initiative that significantly improved the U.S. military's capacity to secure the population and to acquire better tactical intelligence. Under CAP, a Marine rifle squad assisted a platoon of local indigenous forces. This combined Marine and indigenous platoon trained, patrolled, defended, and lived together in the platoon's village. CAP's missions were to--

* Destroy VC infrastructure within the village or hamlet area of responsibility.

* Provide public security and help maintain law and order.

* Protect friendly infrastructure.

* Protect bases and communications within the villages and hamlets.

* Organize indigenous intelligence nets.

* Participate in civic action and conduct propaganda against the VC.

Civic action played an important role in efforts to destroy the VC because it brought important intelligence about enemy activity from the local population. Because CAP protected the villagers from reprisals, it was ideal for acquiring intelligence from locals. The Marines' focus on pacifying highly populated areas prevented guerrillas from coercing the local population into providing rice, intelligence, and sanctuary. The Marines would clear and hold a village in this way and then expand the secured area.

CAP units accounted for 7.6 percent of the enemy killed while representing only 1.5 percent of the Marines in Vietnam. CAP employed U.S. troops and leadership in an economy of force while maximizing the use of indigenous troops. A modest investment of U.S. forces at the village level yielded major improvements in local security and intelligence. (16)

Even though CORDS was integrated under MACV in 1967, Abrams and William Colby, Director of CORDS, expanded the program and invested it with good people and resources. Under Abrams' one-war approach to Vietnam, CORDS provided oversight of the pacification effort. After 1968, Abrams and Colby made CORDS and pacification the principal effort. A rejuvenated civil and rural development program provided increased support, advisers, and fundings to police and territorial forces (regional forces and popular forces). The new emphasis on rural development allowed military and civilian advisers from the U.S. Agency for International Development to work better with their Vietnamese counterparts at the provincial and village levels to improve local security and develop infrastructure.