Zero-defect leaders: no second chance? 3d place 2001 MacArthur Writing Award Winner

Military Review, Sept-Oct, 2004 by Claire E. Steele

Pervasive zero-defect mentality; it is a cancer that is eating, us all

--General James L. Jones, Jr. (1)

IN THE AGE of the so-called zero-defect military, senior officers increasingly recognize that pursuing perfection in officer performance hurts the military services. In an address to the U.S. Army Command and General Staff Officer's Course in 2001, Commandant of the Marine Corps General James L. Jones, Jr., stated, "Today, standards are incredibly high.... I never would have made it past major if I had been held to the same standard as you." (2) Vice Chief of Staff of the Army General John M. Keane recently sent a letter to senior commanders in the field concerning junior officer retention, which said in part, "We hear from ... captains that they are frustrated by what they perceive as a 'zero-defect' mentality and a resulting culture of micromanagement. They came into the Army to lead soldiers and to willingly shoulder the immense responsibility that goes with command; however, they tell us that this responsibility has been taken away from them by leaders more concerned with making sure nothing goes wrong on their watch." (3)

While today's military leaders recognize the symptoms of the zero-defect cancer, they must look back in history to find the cure. Four prominent leaders from the past were actors in incidents that would have ended their careers today or at least prevented promotions, but each worked for superiors who understood them and allowed them to recover from their mistakes. Perhaps the real heroes are the four illustrious officers' bosses: Rear Admiral U.R. Harris, Brigadier General Charles Heywood, Major General William R. Smith, and General Ewing E. Booth, who mentored their officers and did not destroy their careers when they made mistakes.

Fleet Admiral Chester W. Nimitz, U.S. Navy. As a 22-year old ensign, Nimitz took command of the USS Decatur, the first destroyer commissioned in the U.S. Navy. For someone so young to be given a destroyer command was unusual. Nimitz's contemporaries, future admirals Raymond A. Spruance, Bill Halsey, and Ernest King, commanded destroyers when they were between the ages of 26 and 36. (4) Harris recognized Nimitz's competence as a naval officer and entrusted him with an early destroyer command.

On 7 July 1908, when the Decatur entered Batangas Harbor in the Philippines, Nimitz carelessly estimated the Decatur's position instead of taking his bearings and failed to check the tide's direction. The Decatur ran aground on a mud bank, and a small steamboat rescued it the next day. Nimitz reported the incident in detail to the Navy and assumed full responsibility. The Navy court-martialed him on a reduced charge because of his spotless record and the poor condition of the Batangas Harbor charts. The Navy court-martial board found Nimitz guilty of "neglect of duty" and gave him a public reprimand. Two weeks later, Nimitz was relieved of command of the Decatur. (5)

Eighteen months later, a Navy selection board promoted Nimitz to lieutenant, advancing him beyond the next immediate rank of lieutenant junior grade. Thirty-three years later, in December 1941, Nimitz became Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet and Pacific Ocean Areas, where he served throughout World War II. In 1944, he was advanced to the newly created rank of Fleet Admiral, and on 2 September 1945 aboard the battleship USS Missouri in Tokyo Bay, Nimitz was the U.S. signatory to Japan's surrender terms. Thirty-seven years after the incident, Nimitz became Chief of Naval Operations.

Commandant John A. Lejeune, U.S. Marine Corps. Lejeune's first sea assignment was on the USS Bennington in 1891. One of 10 officers on the ship and the only Marine officer, he commanded 28 Marines out of a crew of 192. Lejeune was bored by his less-than-demanding duties in the South Atlantic, but his commanding officer, Royal B.

Bradford, captain of the Bennington, thought Lejeune was a poor performer. On Lejeune's first fitness report, Bradford evaluated Lejeune as "good in professional ability and general conduct ... excellent in sobriety and health [but] not good in attention to duty and efficiency of the men under his command." (6)

Bradford explained his substandard evaluation of Lejeune in the remarks block of the fitness report: "The men under this officer [Lejeune] are not trustworthy as sentries and are not tidy and soldierly in appearance. The officer is apparently too indolent and lacking in zeal; he does not give the personal attention to his men that he should; the result is a want of efficiency in the guard." (7) Even when Lejeune received a second poor fitness report from Bradford, he did not appeal.

Commandant of the Marine Corps Brigadier General Charles Heywood counseled Lejeune sternly in a letter: "[These reports have] greatly disappointed me both as regards to you and the fact that the Corps has been so poorly represented on board the Bennington, and your record as an officer will be greatly affected unless you pay closer attention to your duties." (8)