Fighting "the other war" counterinsurgency strategy in Afghanistan, 2003- 2005

Military Review, Sept-Oct, 2007 by David W. Barno

Oftentimes, this rift has had its origin in relations between the U.S. chief of mission (i.e., our ambassador) and the military commander--each reporting to different chains of command in the midst of a nation embroiled in a counterinsurgency war. Afghanistan in 2003 was no exception--a situation made even more difficult by personnel turnover. After the U.S. ambassador departed in July without a replacement, the deputy chief of mission served as the acting chief for four months, and the presidential special envoy for Iraq and Afghanistan, Zalmay Khalilzad, shuttled in and out. Ultimately named as the new U.S. ambassador, Khalilzad arrived for full-time duties on Thanksgiving Day 2003--but retained his special envoy status and thus had direct and regular access to the president as well as to the Department of State (DOS). (17) As the U.S. and coalition military commander, I reported to the commander of U.S. Central Command, General John P. Abizaid, and through him to the secretary of defense and the president. Our system dictates that our top diplomat and main military commander receive orders from and report to different people, coming together only at the president. Moreover, the cultural differences which separate the departments of State and Defense---and their people--are well known.

Fortunately, chemistry counts, and personalities matter. Ambassador Khalilzad and I both recognized that our personal relationship would set the tone for embassy and military teams across Afghanistan. We established a strong personal bond in Kabul that became a keystone in what would be a seamless approach to the interagency challenges we faced in Afghanistan. (18) (In retrospect, I have viewed this approach as much akin to a "supporting-supported" relationship between the military and the embassy for many tasks involving other than the military elements of power). My guidance to our staff was that as the most powerful organization in the country, we would take a direct interest in everything--not just the traditional warfighting piece. As I told an exasperated and overworked staff officer in October 2003: "We own it all!" (19) Our tactics outside the military arena would largely be characterized as "leading from the rear" but were nonetheless very effective. To demonstrate personal commitment to this unified embassy military approach, I moved into a half-trailer on the embassy compound and established an office there next to the ambassador's. I began each day attending country-team and core security-group meetings with our new ambassador. The message to our staffs was unambiguous: there would be no "white space" between the military and interagency effort in Kabul, and by extension, throughout Afghanistan.

The close personal relationship the ambassador and I established paid us both immense dividends. Through daily meetings of key players in the embassy, we developed a common view of the fight that further cemented the unity of our integrated effort. This shared view significantly shaped our unified interagency approach. It also had a major impact on the direction of our military efforts. (20)