Air-ground cooperation perspectives

Military Review, Nov-Dec, 2003 by Phillip S. Meilinger

AIR-GROUND cooperation (AGC) is the interaction of air and ground forces to ensure the synchronization, coordination, and integration of air operations with the joint commander's campaign plan. Current warfare is moving into an era of dramatic political, technological, and doctrinal change, so AGC must keep pace.

Over the years, there have been persistent concerns regarding AGC's effectiveness, responsiveness, and efficiency. Controversies over Operation Anaconda in Afghanistan and special operations forces (SOF) actions in northern Iraq, for example, are simply the latest in a string of such concerns that stretch back to World War II. (1)

Ground officers have complained that air support is too often insufficient in both volume and timeliness. Airmen's response is that ground officers have too limited a focus and are uninformed on the nature of air operations. The services need to identify the factors that have most often led to trouble and highlight instances where innovation has improved joint operations.

Factors for Discord

The services' unique characteristics reflect their inherent strengths and limitations. Wise commanders and planners search for the best joint mix and the best concept of operations that will maximize individual components' strengths while masking or minimizing their limitations. Nonetheless, the fundamental differences between the services, based on the medium in which they primarily operate, plus decades of cultural traditions and institutional history, give soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines unique perspectives on war.

Service cultures. The services have distinct personalities that shape force structure and doctrine. Their cultural inclinations result from historical experiences that resonate deeply within each service. (2) For example, in the past, Air Force interest in strategic bombing led to Army perceptions that the Air Force did not take AGC seriously. This doubt was reinforced in Korea and Vietnam where the Air Force was not prepared to conduct effective tactical air operations at the outset of hostilities. Although airmen quickly addressed the problems, concerns remained. Those concerns led to complaints as well as attempts to assign Air Force fighter-bombers directly to ground units and to develop combat helicopters that could provide traditional close air support (CAS) and air interdiction (AI).

Similarly, the Marine Corps recalls the events that occurred at Guadalcanal, where marines were dependent on Navy gunfire and carrier-based aircraft for fire support. The fear of Japanese air and naval attack caused the aircraft carriers to leave the marines on the beach without fire support. To prevent a recurrence, the Marine Corps eventually formed marine air-ground task forces (MAGTFs), which were combined arms units designed to work together as a single force. The Marine Corps has resisted all attempts to split the MAGTF by assigning its forces--air or ground--to another service.

Perspective. Perspective is another source of contention. The Air Force maintains that an aircraft's ability to strike anywhere within a theater means that air leaders must think in a similarly broad vein. On the other hand, ground commanders' concerns have traditionally been with the area to their front, stretching out to perhaps 30 miles. Although concerned about activities beyond that, their interest is not as immediate. This issue has received increased visibility because a number of the Army's organic fire support weapons now have enhanced range capabilities. (3) More important, the rapid move on Baghdad in Operation Iraqi Freedom by U.S. ground forces signaled a dramatic new capability. If ground commanders can shoot deep and move deep quickly, they will be more inclined to think deep.

Battle rhythms. The services' different battle rhythms, operational tempos, and planning cycles are also at issue. In the case of land combat, for example, there exists a phenomenon known as the culminating point, where operations surge forward but then slow down to allow soldiers to regroup, rest, and bring fuel, food, ammunition, and supplies forward. This pause is generally preparatory to another surge, as for example, the 3-day halt outside Baghdad in Operation Iraqi Freedom preparatory to the final drive on the city.

In air operations, a culminating point seldom exists. Instead, airmen generally conduct combat air operations at a high pace for an indefinite period. In Operation Allied Force, NATO air assets, although dependent on political constraints as well as weather, operated at a high and nearly continuous tempo for 78 straight days.

Air and ground operations' planning cycles are dissimilar. The joint force air component commander (JFACC) or the coalition force air component commander (CFACC) develops the air tasking order (ATO) that manages all theater air assets. Although the JFACC or CFACC updates the ATO daily, planning begins 72 hours in advance of each day's operation. Historically, the ATO has left room for operational flexibility during execution, including the ability to respond to immediate and time-sensitive targets. Flexibility occurs through scheduling sorties that have no designated targets. Aircraft take off and report to a specific area or controller for directions.