Air-ground cooperation perspectives

Military Review, Nov-Dec, 2003 by Phillip S. Meilinger

Commanders submit routine ground-force requests for air support in advance through tactical air control parties at each ground headquarters from battalion to corps. The joint force land component commander (JFLCC) or the coalition force land component commander (CFLCC) prioritizes air requests. Once having consolidated the prioritized air support request, the JFACC develops the ATO.

The JFLCC also has a theaterwide focus, which is reflected in the objectives that he assigns to subordinate units during each phase of an operation. The JFLCC's operations order (OPORD) defines overall land-force objectives, describes the enemy threat, assigns missions, allocates forces to the various corps, and provides guidance applicable to the immediate battle area.

The OPORD-generation process, repeated at each ground-force echelon, has a threat, objective, and task organization peculiar to its mission and geographic sector. Each OPORD's primary components include a scheme of maneuver and a fire support plan plus annexes for other supporting activities. The ground planning staff initiates OPORD components before an operation. Rarely does this occur 72 hours in advance. Often, new OPORDs result from a changing threat; a revised objective or mission statement; or a requirement to move beyond existing sector boundaries. Each new OPORD results in intense, time-sensitive planning activities. Ordinarily, the ground-planning staff can generate a corps OPORD and a nested family of supporting OPORDs in a matter of hours. In short, the respective planning cycles for air (deliberate and orderly) and of ground (episodic and reactive) staffs do not always synchronize with each other because of the unique nature of their respective operations.

Prioritizing air assets. Because of the differences in perspective and rhythms, air and ground officers often disagree regarding air priorities. Airmen see gaining air superiority as the joint force's primary objective, although the services often differ on how best to attain that air superiority. For example, the Air Force wants air superiority gained quickly over the entire theater so it can conduct other air operations simultaneously without threat. Attaining this degree of dominance usually entails an offensive campaign to destroy or neutralize the enemy's air force, his command and control (C2) system, and his ground-based air defenses. The last is important. If enemy air defenses are left intact, some friendly air missions, such as AI, CAS, reconnaissance, and airlift, which are essential to the joint force, can become problematic. The other services do not always see such all-encompassing air superiority as necessary. Soldiers and marines are most concerned with the air above their heads, and sailors are most concerned with the air above their fleet.

Airmen also often see long-range strike as most supportive of the joint force commander's goals. If the intent is to shape the battlefield, then hitting the enemy as far back as possible seems logical. In this view, it is wiser to destroy enemy tanks, tracks, and infantrymen before they close with friendly forces. As a result, AI is often seen as a more effective and, thus, a higher priority mission than is CAS. A common metaphor that airmen use is that of attempting to dam a waterfall; it is far easier to stop it at its source above rather than stand at the bottom with a handful of buckets. (4) To the soldier, the immediate battle is of paramount importance, so he would accord CAS the highest priority. Interdiction of enemy reinforcements would be of little importance if friendly forces were overrun in the meantime.