Air-ground cooperation perspectives

Military Review, Nov-Dec, 2003 by Phillip S. Meilinger

In truth, airmen do not see things so starkly. When friendly forces are in danger, commanders divert all air assets to protect them. However, the military should not use airpower as a substitute for artillery. If organic fire support is available, it should be used. Only if fire support is inadequate should there be a request for airpower. Still, airmen jettison this view when air assets are abundant. For example, in South Vietnam, the Air Force flew nearly 4 million sorties in support of ground forces; over 633,000 were classified as CAS. (5)

Another exception to airmen's belief in the efficacy of AI over CAS concerns the Marine Corps. Before World War II the Marine Corps developed a doctrine of amphibious operations that employed a quick, sharp, unexpected assault against a defended coastline. Because of the emphasis on speed and agility, the Marine Corps did not have the organic firepower (heavy artillery or tanks) necessary to ensure force protection over an extended period. Carrier-based air or naval gunfire would instead provide fire support. All involved expected that such operations would either be over quickly or that soldiers, who came equipped with their own fire support, would replace the marines.

After World War II, marines were not often used as amphibious strike forces. They performed the more traditional role of ground troops, such as at Khe Sanh during the Vietnam war. They used airpower as a substitute for organic fire support assets. This model has both pluses and minuses; Marine Corps air forces are highly responsive and effective, but they are inefficient in dollar terms. The question is has the evolving nature of modern war altered this cost-benefit relationship?

Fratricide and risk. The key area of discord among the services is the issue of fratricide and risk. The issue most directly affects the problems of responsiveness and misunderstanding. Although the services experience differing tempos and cycles, they are alike in sharing a fear of fratricide. Friendly fire is a depressing fact. During World War II, 2 percent of all Army combat deaths were caused by fratricide. In some cases, fratricide was ground-on-ground (57 percent); in others, it was air-on-ground (37 percent) or ground-on-air (6 percent). (6) The problem has not disappeared. During Operation Desert Storm, nearly 25 percent of all U.S. combat casualties were caused by fratricide. (7) In Operation Iraqi Freedom, U.S. Patriot batteries shot down the first two coalition fixed-wing aircraft lost. Soon after, an Air Force A-10 attacked U.S. marines.

Besides the increased lethality and accuracy of U.S. weapons, battlespace nonlinearity has been a major problem in Afghanistan and Iraq (as it was in Vietnam and Kosovo). Time-honored methods of designating positions by lines on a map are less useful in a nonlinear battlespace. Identification and location problems are more complex because of the increased presence of coalition or indigenous ground forces, with which U.S. forces have had only limited cooperation in the past. An added complication is the increasing prevalence of small, mobile targets.