Air-ground cooperation perspectives

Military Review, Nov-Dec, 2003 by Phillip S. Meilinger

Related to the issue of fratricide is the growing concern over risk to aircrews. Beginning with Operation Desert Storm, the United States has sustained amazingly light casualties in combat. In the 78-day Operation Allied Force, for example, only two NATO aircraft were shot down, and both pilots were quickly recovered. In Operation Iraqi Freedom, only one aircraft was lost to enemy fire, and the pilot was recovered. Such events have set a high bar for U.S. military operations. In fact, during Operation Allied Force, NATO commander General Wesley K. Clark specifically instructed his CFACC that a prime consideration of the air campaign was to minimize friendly air losses. NATO cohesion was shaky, and he feared that significant aircrew casualties would split the alliance and end the operation. (8)

Fratricide and risk have had an increasingly major effect on AGC. The unusually bloodless conflicts of the past 12 years have made political leaders somewhat risk averse. Military commanders have responded by implementing more stringent rules of engagement (ROE) and tactical procedures. (9) In some cases this has resulted in elaborate identification methods for friendly ground troops and their precise locations. But, with attempts to limit fratricide come complications. In Afghanistan and Iraq there were "no engagement zones," "limited engagement zones," "special engagement zones," and "special operations areas," all of which had their own ROE and which were often controlled by different agencies or services that were not necessarily in direct or continual contact with each other.

Another tension within the fratricide and risk issue concerns platforms and ordnance employed. Air ordnance might have several desirable characteristics speed, accuracy, persistence, lethality, cost, and availability--that dictate what weapons and platforms forces need. But, such flexibility is difficult to achieve. Although a force might need a stealthy platform because of enemy air defenses, F-117s or B2s might be unavailable. Similarly, although aircraft might contain high-explosive bombs, the target might require cluster bomb units. Attempting to match platforms and ordnance with targets, especially targets of a pop-up nature, is a challenging proposition. (10) As a result, the military is developing the following:

* "Dial-a-yield" and "dial-a-fuze" weapons, which can be set in the cockpit.

* Small diameter bombs.

* Standoff weapons, which could employ both laser and Global Positioning System (GPS) guidance.

* Personal transponders to keep track of friendly forces.

* Improved sensors and data links to both the cockpit and the ground.

In a more general and more important sense, however, the desire to avoid fratricide and risk has meant a dramatically increased need for battlespace awareness. Ground and air forces must be aware of the precise location of friendly forces as well as enemy forces, potential targets, enemy air defense sites, and civilian personnel and facilities. Only by possessing such broad yet detailed intelligence can joint commanders confidently employ force.