Air-ground cooperation perspectives

Military Review, Nov-Dec, 2003 by Phillip S. Meilinger

New or improved sensors such as unmanned aerial vehicles, satellite imagery, and aerial reconnaissance are addressing the expanding intelligence need. In addition, ground forces can use GPS receivers to determine accurately their own positions--regardless of the terrain or weather--as well as that of the enemy. Ground forces could then pass enemy coordinates directly to strike aircraft.

The cost of developing the requisite sensors, interfaces, and analysts is not the only downside to this enhanced sensor-to-shooter capability. The extra time required to employ such systems is also a factor. Commanders, increasingly mindful of ensuring the accurate, safe employment of force, often take more time to reach a decision than was the case when they had less input to consider.

Old concerns regarding the timeliness of air support--in the past often a function of technological limitations--are now more apt to be the result of an elongated decision cycle occurring at headquarters; it is a human problem. Operations in Afghanistan seemed to confirm this new twist to an old problem. (11) Fortunately, the CFACC learned from this experience. In Operation Iraqi Freedom, he established a "time-sensitive target cell" responsible for fast-tracking air responses to key targets. (12) The new cell handled the strikes on 156 crucial targets, including leadership, weapons of mass destruction, and terrorists targets. Through the same process, the force struck 686 "dynamic" targets, including high-value mobile targets that did not fall into the other categories. (13)

The end result of the fratricide and risk issue, combined with the modern, nonlinear battlespace's nature, was to bring into even sharper focus operations tempo and cycle issues. While airmen are more concerned about carefully planning strikes, the operational situation places enhanced emphasis on fluidity, flexibility, and responsiveness. (14)

Catalysts for Change

An examination of AGC's history shows that many changes have occurred technologically, structurally, and doctrinally. Leadership, technology, and wartime experience drives such changes. Sometimes, change occurs only when creative, bureaucratically fearless leaders step forward to impose change on balky services. Imagining Army AirLand Battle Doctrine occurring without Generals William DePuy and Donn Starry is difficult. (15) On the other hand, nameless officers at various schools, doctrine centers, and operational units have also made valuable contributions over the decades, even if they cannot be singled out.

Necessity is indeed the mother of invention. Adaptations to AGC have included, inter alia, the following:

* The use of radio communications between aircraft and ground elements.

* High drag or "parafrag" bombs to allow accurate delivery at low altitudes.

* Radar bombing techniques.

* Increasingly accurate precision guided munitions (PGMs).

* The Joint Tactical Intelligence Data System.

During Operation Desert Storm, coalition aircraft employed infrared sensors to detect Iraqi tanks and other armored vehicles in the desert, which were then "plinked" with laser-guided bombs. In Afghanistan, U.S. forces began "blue force tracking," which uses a miniature transponder that relies on GPS satellite signals relayed to ground and airborne receivers. During Operation Iraqi Freedom, forces used thermal panels to designate coalition vehicles, and the CFACC established an air component coordination element in seven ground headquarters to facilitate cooperation and to limit misunderstanding between air and ground components.