Air-ground cooperation perspectives

Military Review, Nov-Dec, 2003 by Phillip S. Meilinger

Using heavy aircraft (B-I, B-2, and B-52) allows a far greater loiter time over the battlespace, which translates into enhanced persistence. In Afghanistan and Iraq, the B-1 and B-52 spent up to 8 hours orbiting designated sectors while waiting for ground spotters or other intelligence sensors to identify targets of opportunity.

During Operation Desert Storm, airmen also innovated with Push-CAS and kill boxes to enhance the ability to provide responsive air support. (17) Now might be the time to consider aircraft as a substitute for Army artillery in some situations. But, there are tradeoffs. Artillery generally offers greater responsiveness and persistence, while air-delivered ordnance is usually more accurate and lethal. Although air assets can never replace organic fire support assets, examining whether substitution is sometimes possible is worthwhile.

Operational concepts.

Jointness is a way of life. The services or functional staffs often plan current military operations, which the components (working together but separately) implement. In other words, CFACC and CFLCC staffs plan an operation; coordinate plans with the other components; and pass them up ward to the combatant commander for approval. The component units conduct their own tactical planning and preparations, coordinating their activities with each other. The services then conduct the operation. The U.S. military has no joint tactical units that contain both air and ground elements, with the notable exception of some SOF units.

Afghanistan saw the unusual situation where the CFACC deployed forward to the theater, but the combatant commander and his staff remained in Florida. For Operation Iraqi Freedom, U.S. Army General Tommie Franks deployed forward, but to a location different from that of the CFACC. The CFLCC's headquarters was in yet another location.

Separate but equal service and functional staffs, which include some degree of liaison with each other, might be insufficient to keep pace with modern war's frenetic nature. Forming a joint battle staff, which would include the physical presence of the CFACC and the CFLCC and other component and functional commanders under the combatant commander's control, might be feasible. The staff would be truly joint, thus eliminating the need for liaison elements that might or might not be effective in coordinating joint combat operations. (The air component was not well integrated into planning for Operation Anaconda. Poor coordination caused serious consequences in the battle, which having a single battle staff could have eliminated.)

The unified commands are now experimenting with such units as standing joint task forces, but a recurring problem has been the dearth of qualified personnel to staff them in times of crisis. The Pacific Command and the European Command first addressed this issue, and now the Joint Forces Command has been assigned the problem.

Ground-assisted precision strike (GAPS) is a new concept that looks at AGC through a new lens. (18) In Bosnia, Kosovo, Afghanistan, and Iraq, traditional CAS and AI missions have been stretched almost beyond recognition. CAS assumes there are friendly troops in close proximity, which requires detailed coordination between air and ground elements. AI involves destroying or disrupting enemy forces and their supply lines before enemy forces can engage friendly forces.