Air-ground cooperation perspectives

Military Review, Nov-Dec, 2003 by Phillip S. Meilinger

But suppose friendly forces are not present, or what if friendly forces are only present in limited numbers? What if the enemy, rather than moving to engage U.S. forces, hides or even moves away from U.S. forces? These situations would require different procedures than those currently established in joint doctrine. The Air Force has, therefore, proposed a new category, GAPS, which is designed to hit enemy forces or facilities using ground spotters (generally SOF teams) or airborne sensors. Many such operations were flown in Afghanistan and in Operation Iraqi Freedom.

GAPS might prove not to be a useful concept and be abandoned. The Army views GAPS with some suspicion and wonders if the Air Force is backing away from a commitment to CAS. (19) Still, there are similarities between GAPS and the battlefield air interdiction (BAI) concept, an idea that the Army and NATO have supported but that the Air Force did not wholeheartedly accept. Perhaps the issue is just another example of a struggle over control. In BAI, the ground commander would nominate targets in front of the fire support coordination line but not in close proximity to friendly forces. In GAPS, an airman would select the targets (as in AI) and control air assets. If this issue is the real point of contention, it is an unworthy concern. The focus, as always, should be on achieving objectives at the least cost.

Education and training. Over the past decade, the services have made great strides in fostering and implementing joint training and education, which has forced the services to learn more about each other. The Army and Air Force hold warfighting conferences annually as a way of highlighting mutual problems and effecting solutions. Also, the increasing power of the unified commands and their staffs places great emphasis on jointness at the warfighting level. This is good. However, more could be done at the tactical level.

A recent General Accounting Office report, critical of AGC joint training, notes that such training is infrequent, unrealistic, and nonstandardized. (20) The Air Force chief of staff echoed this concern, noting that too often air and ground units approach joint exercises with service-centric training objectives. CAS is avoided so ground forces can exercise their close combat capabilities. (21) Perhaps, given the critical stake that all of the services have in its effectiveness, AGC would be an area in which to experiment using joint tactical units. The services must increase and take more seriously exchange and liaison positions. For example, although the Air Force and the Army have designated slots in each other's command and staff echelons, the positions are not always fully manned. Worse, such assignments are not always seen as "career enhancing," which means that individuals are reluctant to work in such joint billets for fear of hurting their promotion opportunities.

All of these concerns call for an increase in joint exercises and simulations that employ new concepts and, perhaps, new joint tactical units. In the past, the Army and Air Force have generally trained together only during major exercises and actual contingencies. Joint tactical exercises with the Navy and Marine Corps are even less frequent. (22) This must change.