Civil War Artillery at Gettysburg: Organization, Equipment, Ammunition, and Tactics

Military Review, Nov-Dec, 2003 by James Gates

Philip M. Cole, DaCapo Press, Cambridge, MA, 2002, 320 pages, $35.00.

Although slightly repetitive, awkwardly written, and probably mistitled, Philip M. Cole's much-needed book of 19th-century artillery is ostensibly about artillery at Gettysburg. However, only about 25 pages are actually devoted to the battle; Cole examines the artillery arm for the entire Civil War. Rather than being a dull treatise, Artillery at Gettysburg: Organization, Equipment, Ammunition, and Tactics proves to be an engaging book. Cole describes the development, procurement, and organization of each army's artillery branch, noting similarities and differences.

Cole explains the benefits and liabilities of each piece of artillery used during the Civil War and describes the variety of rifled guns, from cast iron to bronze, as well as a variety of rifled guns including the 2.9-inch Parrot and the exotic Whitworth breechloading rifles used by the Confederacy. Complementing the discussion of the actual cannon, Cole includes chapters on logistics, training, various types of ammunition, and the support structure. His use of photographs, diagrams, and maps are excellent and integrate seamlessly into the text.

One of the most important segments of the book is the organization of the artillery for the both armies. Although each army had a chief of artillery (Confederate General William Pendleton and Union General Henry Hunt), the opposing forces organized their artillery in subtle but different ways. While each army had an artillery reserve, the Confederate Army parceled out its reserve into three infantry corps, which made communication and concentration difficult. The Union Army concentrated its reserve in one solid mass.

Hunt was nominally in command of all artillery at Gettysburg even though each corps had its own allocation of batteries. This difference allowed Hunt to rapidly shift batteries around the battlefield to threatened areas.

Hunt wanted to conserve ammunition until General Robert E. Lee began his charge, then devastate the enemy as it crossed the killing ground. Second Corps commander General Winfield Hancock wanted his artillery to respond to Lee's cannonade to keep up the morale of his troops. Hunt was thinking of effectiveness and killing power while Hancock was thinking of morale.

The book has a few minor weaknesses. Cole spends too much time discussing the British Whitworth guns. The Confederates had only two Whitworth guns on the battlefield, and their effectiveness was negligible. Also, Cole's analysis focuses more on the technology, organization, and support of the artillery and less on the actual performance of the artillery during the battle. Despite such flaws, the book is interesting and informative. Not only does it explain why events unfolded the way they did, it helps explain how they unfolded.

MAJ James Gates, USAF,

Lake Ridge, Virginia