Effective joint training: meeting the challenges

Military Review, Nov-Dec, 2004 by Nicholas R. Marsella

TODAY'S SUCCESSFUL military operations are joint operations. Senior military and civilian leaders recognize the need for increased jointness at every level. Chief of Staff of the Army General Peter J. Schoomaker stated the requirement for "achieving joint interdependence" within the Army's culture, structure, and operations because we do not fight alone. (1) One way to establish joint interdependence and increase our collective warfighting capability is through joint training.

For the last decade, joint training has been the responsibility of combatant commanders with assistance from the U.S. Joint Forces Command (USJFCOM). As the joint trainer, USJFCOM supports computer-driven, operational-level exercises to train joint staff processes and procedures. With the 2002 publication of the Strategic Plan for Transforming DOD [Department of Defense] Training, USJFCOM's training mission expanded to create a Joint National Training Capability (JNTC). (2)

JNTC: What It Is and Is Not

JNTC is not a place. (3) It is a training capability intended to increase the level and complexity of joint training by integrating existing service training facilities with joint and service training events and exercises.

JNTC is not one set of training devices or simulations; it is a linkage of existing service training structures, simulations, and systems inside a common joint framework. Its challenge is to solve the many technical problems of linking separately designed service simulations, virtual trainers, and existing live training opportunities to provide a seamless picture via existing command and control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (C4ISR) networks. As Deputy Undersecretary of Defense for Readiness Paul Mayberry notes, "A JNTC encompasses more than a set of training ranges." (4)

JNTC's purpose is to train soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines in collective and individual joint tactical tasks. In the past, joint training has focused on staff training at the joint task force (JTF) and component levels (for example, the Joint Force Land Component [JFLC]). JNTC's focus is to train tasks that require jointness to the lowest level while supporting training for continued joint proficiency at higher levels.

JNTC Vignette

Envision an infantry brigade on a cold January morning at the National Training Center (NTC) at Fort Irwin, California, as it prepares to conduct an attack. The brigade is under the command and control of a division headquarters located at Fort Hood, Texas, which is also a training participant. In addition to the brigade at the NTC, the division controls U.S. Marine Corps (USMC) forces at Twentynine Palms, California, and other "constructive" BLUFOR [Blue Force] ground forces in the "synthetic world of a computer simulation" with tactical command posts at Fort Hood.

A JTF headquarters at Suffolk, Virginia, maintains electronic connectivity with a "live maritime force," a carrier strike group off the coast of California, and with its joint force air component at Nellis Air Force Base, Nevada, controlling live and constructive sorties. All participants, from the three-star JTF commander to the NTC soldier performing surveillance, use the same scenario and BLUFOR mission set. Observer-trainers from the services, USJFCOM, and other specialists are scattered throughout the force.

The enemy is an adaptive, defending opposing force (OPFOR) equipped with a wide range of weapons systems and capabilities located at the NTC and Twentynine Palls arrayed in the computer simulation. Each component and its respective training audiences understand the OPFOR's capabilities and intent and the operational environment's complexity.

As the BLUFOR operation progresses, the NTC OPFOR sees an opportunity to fix BLUFOR units through a demonstration with both military and paramilitary forces while creating incidents against the BLUFOR to affect the attitude of the local population. At the same time, the OPFOR will conduct a strike by isolating and destroying a small U.S. force to exploit the reaction to success as reflected by the media. At the same time, the OPFOR hopes to successfully interdict and ambush key BLUFOR lines of communication.

In BLUFOR brigade command posts, a common operating picture displays a synthetic battlefield with annotated BLUFOR and OPFOR locations. Intelligence from simulations, virtual unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), and live intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) populate the automated data processing systems and provide situational awareness. To the brigade commanders, all OPFOR units are threats and, as with BLUFOR units, it is transparent which are live and which are simulated.

As a BLUFOR company begins movement, the commander receives reports from the battalion and units in contact. As the OPFOR's locations become known, the company commander recognizes the danger of being isolated and requests support. As rehearsed, the battalion requests immediate joint close air support (JCAS). A section of two aircraft from a carrier operating off the coast of California is available for immediate support. (5)