A view from the FA49 foxhole: operational research and systems analysis

Military Review, Nov-Dec, 2004 by David F. Melcher, John G. Ferrari

The tools and knowledge ORSAs bring to the analysis of joint effects and campaign plan metrics are invaluable. There is a definite need for combat analysts to be a part of the UEx and UEy battle staffs, as well as the battle staffs of both the Joint Combatant and Task Force Commander.--MG Rick Olson (1)

Operations Research Systems Analysis is not business management, it's warfighting capability analysis--a critical part of the Joint, Combined Arms Team!--General Benjamin S. Griffin (2)

CHIEF OF STAFF of the Army (CSA) General Peter J. Schoomaker has set the Army on course to "be a more relevant and ready force--a campaign-quality Army with a Joint and Expeditionary Mindset." (3) To accomplish this transformation, the Army is examining changes made over the past 20 years, including the officer functional areas the Officer Personnel Management System (OPMS) III put into place during the late 1990s. OPMS III's emphasis on specialization and multiple career paths promotes longer tours of duty and efforts to stabilize units and eliminate unnecessary personnel turbulence.

From the perspective of the Functional Area 49 (FA49) "foxhole," the Operations Research Systems Analyst (ORSA) career field is changing to align with the Army's core competencies of training and equipping soldiers, growing leaders, and providing combatant commanders a relevant and ready landpower capability as part of the joint team.

Every organization must adapt or perish. ORSAs are no exception. Since World War II, the military operations research analyst has been critical to the military's operational and institutional success. During the past decade, however, changes to the ORSA career field and a migration of the specialty from the operational Army to the institutional Army have reduced ORSAs' opportunities to directly support the operational commander. Recognizing this shortcoming, FA49 is making changes internally and seeking changes on operational Army and joint staffs.

Driving the changes are the insights gained through the multiple deployments of analysts to Bosnia and Kosovo in Operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom (OEF/OIF) and experiments with the unit of action and unit of employment (UEx and UEy) organizational concepts. (4) Providing coverage for deployments has been a team effort across the Army analytical community and includes civilian analysts. The insights gained show that an embedded analytical cell with G3 and G5 plans is needed to provide rigorous analysis that is operationally relevant, reaching across the entire battle staff through the staff and planning groups.

ORSA's Core Competency

ORSA's core competency is much broader than simple numerical and quantitative analysis. While ORSAs are extremely competent in quantitative analysis, their true core competency is in problem solving. They look at a problem as a complex system with many quantitative and qualitative variables, break it down, analyze its primary parts, and propose solutions. The FA49 mission statement describes ORSA's core competency best--"[to] produce analysis ..., to underpin decisions by leaders ..., and to enable solutions to varied and complex strategic, operational, tactical, and managerial issues." (5)

ORSAs are specialists trained in problem solving as a core competency, but the combat ORSA must be much more. Combat ORSAs must always remember they are soldiers first. The operational Army is not a "union shop" where roles and functions are contractually delineated. Deployment of FA49 analysts teaches that ORSAs must remain operationally competent across the spectrum of skills resident in joint and combined battle staffs. For example, ORSAs deployed with Combined Joint Task Force 7 (CJTF-7) to Iraq and the combined joint task forces in Afghanistan helped joint force commanders--

[] Analyze the number and emplacement of medical evacuation helicopter fleets to determine future force-flow requirements.

[] Recommend changes in the emplacement of counterftre radars to maximize effectiveness in identifying mortar and rocket fires aimed at base camps.

[] Examine the locations of improvised explosive devices (IEDs) to determine possible enemy ammunition caches.

[] Assess counter-IED procedures to reduce attacks on convoy supply routes.

[] Develop metrics and assess plans and operations to adjust future combat operations.

[] Analyze critical nodes and desired effects in the joint effects working group to modify operational plans.

[] Analyze poll results about counterinsurgency operations to gauge the success of efforts to win the hearts and minds of the local population.

[] Examine militia reintegration as a way to begin disarming private armies.

[] Assess the effectiveness of combat and security operations on enemy activity.

These problems, solved by just a few deployed analysts over the past year, demonstrate the need for embedded analysts who are operationally competent; understand combat operations across the range of the entire joint planning group and battle staff; and have tactical, operational, strategic, and joint knowledge that transcends statistics and other quantitative analysis techniques. The analyst must also possess the softer skills required to be able to work in a coalition environment and operate with interagency, nongovernmental, and host-nation civilians.