The Falklands war: the Bluff Cove disaster

Military Review, Nov-Dec, 2004 by Robert S. Bolia

This left Moore with a decision to make. Should he move the remaining 3 Commando Brigade units forward, leaving 5 Brigade to guard the beachhead and act as a reserve, or should he open up an axis of advance along the south coast of East Falkland, sending 5 Brigade to take up positions on the right flank, before making the final push to Stanley?

Sound military reasons existed for the former approach. A well-practiced unit, 3 Commando Brigade had trained together for years. (6) Its soldiers and marines were better acclimated to the weather conditions in the Falklands as a result of their longer tenure in theater and from years of training in Norway. They were also positioned forward and ready to fight; indeed, 2 Para had already proven itself in combat at Goose Green.

While legitimate military reasons existed for opening a southern axis of advance, Moore's decision seems to have been largely political. On the passage south, Wilson, 5 Brigade's commander, pressed Moore to consider the southern option. According to one Royal Marine staff officer, Wilson was "obsessed with the fear that Julian Thompson [3 Commando Brigade commander] would win the war before his men could do anything." (7) While any brigade commander would have a natural desire to demonstrate his brigade's effectiveness in combat, Wilson's desire in this case weighed more heavily on Moore than it perhaps should have. As a Royal Marine general, he felt acutely that he should not show undue favoritism toward the Marines. By giving Wilson his southern axis, Moore perhaps hoped he was giving the Army an equal chance for glory. (8)

When Moore sanctioned the southern thrust, he expected 5 Brigade to disembark at San Carlos, march south to Goose Green, then "yomp" east across the south coast, moving into position on the right flank of 3 Commando Brigade in the hills outside Stanley. Instead, 2 Para (under 5 Brigade's operational control) "hijacked" a Chinook helicopter and leaped forward to Fitzroy Settlement and Bluff Cove without first notifying Moore, but with Wilson's approval. Wilson then presented the action to Moore as a fait accompli. (9)

Although daring and successful, 2 Para's dash was not sound from a military viewpoint. The battalion, which had moved about 55 kilometers ahead of the next nearest 5 Brigade unit, had no artillery or air support and no means of immediate reinforcement. The battalion was isolated, and any Argentine attempt to take advantage of this isolation could have been disastrous. Indeed, their landing at Fitzroy was almost the cause of a blue-on-blue incident when they were spotted by a Mountain and Arctic Warfare Cadre observation post. According to Lance-Corporal Steve Nicoll of 7 Counter-Insurgency Squadron, Calculating co-ordinates for a fire mission on the troops, who were bunched and in the open, I opened up communications in the clear, seeking confirmation of friendly forces movement to prevent any loss of reporting time. Cadre HQ [Headquarters] at Teal Inlet, collocated with the 3 Commando Brigade HQ, confirmed there should be no friendly troops to our front. After several questions and answers to confirm details, the fire mission was accepted.... We were waiting for the executive order of 'Three rounds fire for effect.' Precisely at this point the cloud cover opened a 'window' and we saw the easily recognized figure of a Scout helicopter with British markings. It all unfolded in a few very brief seconds--the radio handset was already poised and the command 'Check, check, check,' confirmed sighting of a Scout helicopter. It still wasn't clear if all the activity could be attributed to the British but it was apparent that we had been very close to bringing down fire on our own side." (10)