The Falklands war: the Bluff Cove disaster

Military Review, Nov-Dec, 2004 by Robert S. Bolia

The leap forward by 2 Para exasperated Moore. On the one hand he could not recall 2 Para without appearing to favor the Royal Marines, while on the other hand, appearing to be slow to advance. At the same time, he could not easily reinforce the parachute battalion; there were not enough helicopters to move the rest of the brigade and its equipment by air, and Army units were ill suited to marching in the Falklands. The only choice was to move them by sea. (11)

Transport by sea was probably the fastest way to move a brigade from San Carlos to Fitzroy, but because of the proximity to Stanley and the lack of adequate air defense, far from the safest. The easiest way to accomplish such a movement would have been to use one of the two LPDs [landing platform, dock], either Fearless or Intrepid, but Fleet Headquarters at Northwood, United Kingdom, had forbidden using these high-value assets for this purpose. Intrepid sailed halfway between the two points, where the Scots Guards transferred to LCUs [landing craft, utility] to carry them the rest of the way, allowing Intrepid to be back under a protective air defense umbrella at San Carlos before daylight.

Transferring the Scots Guards went off reasonably well, but communication problems existed between 5 Brigade and the Royal Navy and between the Carrier Battle Group and the Commander, Amphibious Warfare. These failures nearly led to more blue-on-blue incidents. One occurred when Cardiff and Yarmouth nearly fired on the LCUs because their commanders had not been informed of the presence of friendly forces. In the other incident, 2 Para had not been informed of the Scots Guards arrival, and when the Guards appeared, 29 Battery, thinking the Guards were Argentineans attempting an amphibious operation, trained their guns on the Guards. (12)

The Navy planned to use the same tactic to move the Welsh Guards to Bluff Cove, using Fearless instead of Intrepid. This time, two of Fearless's LCUs, preloaded with the Guards' heavy equipment, were ready to sail when they reached Elephant Island, where they rendezvoused with two of Intrepid's LCUs, which had remained at Bluff Cove after having deposited the Guards there the previous night. The two remaining Welsh Guard rifle companies were to embark in these LCUs and follow the others to Bluff Cove. However, when Fearless arrived at the rendezvous point, no LCUs were to be found. (13)

Communications between Fearless and 5 Brigade were so poor it was impossible to find out what had happened to the LCUs, but a decision had to be made as to what to do with the troops and equipment. After some discussion, the command decided to sail the two LCUs immediately and return the following night to land the remaining two rifle companies. (14) The landing of the heavy equipment came off without incident, but a new signal from Northwood prohibited the use of the LPDs without hauling a large escort. (15) A new plan was needed.

Navy commanders soon decided the Welsh Guards would go aboard Sir Galahad, which had been scheduled to take a Rapier surface-to-air missile battery and a field hospital to Fitzroy. This should not have been a problem. There was plenty of room for the Welsh Guards and had Sir Galahad left San Carlos by dusk it should have been able to deposit the Rapiers and the field hospital at Fitzroy and the Welsh Guards at Bluff Cove and still be back at San Carlos before dawn. Unfortunately, because of a number of communications problems, the field hospital took 6 hours to load, and the LSL was not ready to sail until 5 hours after dusk. The captain requested permission to defer until the following night, but his superiors ordered him to go anyway. The only concession they made was to allow him to go to Fitzroy rather than Bluff Cove. The commander did not tell him what to do with the Welsh Guards, and the captain did not tell the Welsh Guards the ship was not going to Bluff Cove. (16)