The Falklands war: the Bluff Cove disaster

Military Review, Nov-Dec, 2004 by Robert S. Bolia

In spite of the tragic loss of life, the disaster at Fitzroy was more a wake-up call than a setback for British forces. Sir Galahad and the LCU were lost along with ammunition and some communications equipment. The debacle delayed the attack on Stanley by 2 days, primarily so two 40 Commando companies could augment the Welsh Guards. (32) But the battle did not affect the war's outcome, and tragically, it might easily have been prevented.

The weather, of course, was an issue. If the skies had not cleared, the Fleet Air Arm (FAA) would never have launched the attack in the first place. That Clapp did not receive the weather reports from Fitzroy was certainly an issue.

The Royal Navy's lack of an airborne early warning (AEW) capability was also important. Indeed, the presence of AEW aircraft in theater might have been sufficient to deter the FAA from making the attack in the first place and would certainly have changed the outcome for Sir Galahad, Sheffield, Coventry, and Atlantic Conveyor.

Poor communications were a major problem. A lack of communication of flight plans led to the accidental shootdown of the Gazelle, and poor real-time communications led to Sir Galahad's failure to receive the air raid warning, leaving those aboard Fearless without knowledge of the LCUs' locations. Another factor was that 5 Brigade moved its combat troops forward in advance of any logistic units. This not only contributed to the disaster, it led to a lack of situational awareness at brigade and division headquarters aboard Fearless after the bombing.

Service parochialism also contributed to events. If Moore had ordered 2 Para back to Goose Green in the first place, 5 Brigade would have been walking across East Falkland, just as the Royal Marines had, and the attack would never have happened. Also, had the Welsh Guard's officers listened to the Navy's advice, they would have disembarked at Fitzroy immediately instead of waiting to be taken to Bluff Cove, a wait which cost many lives.

The lack of a joint force commander in theater was another contributor to the disaster. Admiral Sir John Fieldhouse commanded the task force from a joint headquarters at Northwood. The chain of command arrangement led to miscommunications, misunderstandings, and frustrations. Clapp was a one-star officer while Moore and Woodward were two-star officers, a situation that left Woodward believing he was in the chain of command between Fieldhouse at the top and Clapp at the bottom. Woodward's perspective seems to have significantly colored Fieldhouse's views at Northwood. (33)

Decisions such as not using the LPDs without large escorts might not have been made had a local commander been able to discuss such issues with the task group commander. With hindsight, it is clear that had Fearless been allowed to go all the way to Fitzroy, the Welsh Guards could have been offloaded there, or at Bluff Cove, on the night of 6-7 June--before the weather cleared and before daylight.

No blame was ever officially attached to any commander, although Woodward and Clapp revisited the issue years later in a literary duel. Woodward criticized Clapp for using the LSLs against his advice. (34) Clapp blamed Woodward for the lack of a Harrier CAP on station. One of the British carriers, HMS Hermes, was off having her boilers cleaned at the time of the attack. According to Clapp, this left critical gaps in Harrier coverage. (35)