The Falklands war: the Bluff Cove disaster

Military Review, Nov-Dec, 2004 by Robert S. Bolia

Laying the blame on 5 Brigade is more typical because it is remembered more for being bombed than for its infantry combat. To some extent, 5 Brigade should be held responsible, but to a larger extent, the problem was that 5 Brigade was in a situation for which it had not prepared. Max Hastings points out, "The muddles and problems that beset 5 Brigade occurred in many other places and at many other times during the campaign; the disappearance of the Harrier CAP ... minutes before the air attack; the lack of naval escort; the failure of an air-raid warning to reach the men on Galahad; the delay in setting up Rapier; the collapse of schedules; the breakdown of liaison.... The most difficult failure to excuse is that of communication--the ignorance of so many senior officers about what troops were [doing] where and when." (36)

After the war, a senior officer said events proved "the things we did on the basis of well-tried and proven formations worked, and the ad hoc arrangements turned out much less happily. Joint-service liaison and staff work left much to be desired. From beginning to end, 5 Brigade [was the victim] of 'ad hoccery' [sic]." (37)

The real problem was not 5 Brigade per se, but the fact it probably should not have been there in the first place. Inadequate joint force command structure, poor communications, service parochialism, and a lack of joint exercises--hence joint planning--leading up to the Falklands conflict caused the unsuccessful offloading of the Welsh Guard at Fitzroy. These problems, exacerbated by the lack of AEW, led directly to the loss of 56 British lives on Sir Tristam, Sir Galahad, and an LCU on 8 June 1982.

A modified SH-3 Sea King helicopter served in an AEW capacity. Since British carriers only operated with helicopters or vertical takeoff and landing aircraft, the E-2C Hawkeye was not an option. Seven Royal Air Force E-3D Airborne Early Warning and Control System (AWACS) platforms later augmented the British AEW capability. (38)

Joint integration was more difficult. The British responded by implementing the "fully unified Defense Policy and Operational Staff." (39) This action was amplified by the overturning of the 1981 Defence Review. (40) The review had suggested the Royal Navy no longer required carriers because the RAF could provide fleet defense anywhere in the world. The review also suggested that amphibious vehicles like Fearless and Intrepid were unnecessary because UK forces would never again have to make an opposed amphibious landing. (41) Clearly, the conflict in the Falklands proved both assumptions erroneous. The move toward jointness as detailed in the new defense policy has paid many dividends, including improved jointness in Operation Desert Storm and subsequent joint and coalition operations. (42)

NOTES

(1.) Michael Clapp and Ewen Southby-Tailyour, Amphibious Assault Falklands: The Battle of San Carlos Water (London: Orion, 1996), 286.

(2.) Hugh McManners, Falklands Commando (London: HarperCollins, 2002), 222-23.