Attacking insurgent space: sanctuary denial and border interdiction

Military Review, Nov-Dec, 2006 by Joseph D. Celeski

The U.S. military campaign has disrupted the ease with which Al-Qaeda may operate in Afghanistan and probably will force Al-Qaeda to adapt and evolve in several ways. First, because of U.S. military action, Afghanistan has ceased to be a sanctuary of impunity for Al-Qaeda's senior leadership. Al-Qaeda has 'gone to ground'--hiding from the assault of superior training and weaponry. It now seeks alternative physical and political space to regroup and to reconstitute the infrastructure it lost in Afghanistan, which included training camps as well as its command, control, and communications.

--Michael Sheehan (1)

DENYING INSURGENTS operating space attacks one of the triad of options in irregular warfare (the other two being time and will) that weaker actors employ to take on the strong. Porous borders and spaces for sanctuary, which provide operating space, can prolong an insurgency if the counterinsurgent ignores them or handles them insufficiently. In Afghanistan, while the security line of operation has been effective in enabling friendly social and political processes to proceed, the number one operational dilemma remains the enemy's ability to operate in "ungoverned space" throughout the Pakistani Federally Administered Tribal Area and portions of Baluchistan and to cross the border into Afghanistan whenever he chooses. (2) In Iraq, the issue is not so much the sanctuary afforded by Syria and Iran in the classic sense (providing insurgents safe areas for base camps, reconstitution, recruitment, and training), but porous borders that offer insurgents lines of communication, temporary escape, and transnational transit.

This article provides advice about how to attack insurgents in their sanctuaries. It also suggests measures for conducting effective border interdiction. For this study, insurgent sanctuary is defined as an area in a contiguous nation-state used by insurgents for basing and support (versus such in-country sanctuaries as urban areas, rugged terrain, and sympathetic populations). When insurgents enjoy sanctuary, they can become either a persistent irritant to counterinsurgents, or an operational-level problem.

Sanctuary Benefits

Conventional wisdom says that to win, insurgents must gain both internal and external support for their effort. While the target native population can provide a certain level of assistance, mostly intelligence and warning, immediate logistical needs, and temporary safe haven, insurgents face a real challenge if they are cut off from the normal amenities and access to safe venues in which they can rest, refit, and plan. Sanctuary gives the insurgent all that and more: it effectively allows him to neutralize the superior technology, arms, and training of counterinsurgent forces. (3) At the same time, insurgent fighters can profit from the physical and moral support of the host-nation government and the local populace inside the sanctuary while their leaders conduct an active, unhindered public relations and information operations campaign to legitimize their cause and build support for it. Criminal activity in or near the sanctuary can also work to the insurgents' benefit. Insurgents can get financial and technological support from criminals in exchange for protection, or use smuggling routes as lines of communication.

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Historically, insurgents who have obtained sources of supply and sanctuary and who have operated in favorably rugged terrain have been very difficult to defeat. Conversely, insurgents who did not enjoy sanctuary tended to fail, at least in the security line of operation.

Sanctuary Vulnerabilities

If the advantages of sanctuary and access to border transit are critical to the insurgency, then the sanctuary becomes a center of gravity to be attacked. Insurgents in sanctuary are inherently vulnerable because the government they establish within the sanctuary will automatically threaten their host's sovereignty. Other vulnerabilities include the support they need from the local populace, their sources of supply, and their base defense systems. Insurgents must conduct a fine balancing act to protect all of these vulnerabilities, but their challenge to the host government's authority could be their biggest problem.

In a sense, insurgents hand us a gift when they establish sanctuaries and base camps. Most insurgencies are fought on "human terrain," offering few instances when the counterinsurgent can actually find, fix, and fight the enemy. But when the enemy seeks sanctuary, engagement becomes possible. Once we have located and defined the sanctuary area, we can focus our intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) assets on it and then, in at least some instances, our combat power. We would be negligent if we didn't force insurgents to earn their pay when they congregated and surfaced. Of course, attacking them in their host-nation sanctuary will require synchronization of military and other government agencies' capabilities at the operational level and higher, to ensure that kinetic actions do not result in defeats in the international court of public opinion.