Training indigenous security forces at the Upper End of the counterinsurgency spectrum

Military Review, Nov-Dec, 2006 by John R. Martin

The Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq... is a model for the future: helping others to help themselves is critical to winning the long war.

--Quadrennial Defense Review Report, 6 February 2006

THE "COUNTERINSURGENCY SPECTRUM" may be less of a linear phenomenon than a multifaceted matrix. In that matrix, various factors define the nature of the fight and the challenges facing those who seek to train indigenous security forces to battle the insurgents. The basis of the insurgency is one of the factors: a sectarian insurgency may be more intractable than one based on a particular ideology. An insurgency that limits itself to attacks on valid military targets should be fought differently from one that attacks the population indiscriminately. A low-level insurgency with some "acceptable" level of attacks requires a different approach from one which has advanced to the stage of civil war, where the insurgents are complemented by conventional forces operating from territory controlled by the insurgents, perhaps governed by their political arm. The job of training the host country's security forces is also affected by a variety of determinants. Those include whether sovereignty in the nation involved is being exercised by an indigenous government or by a U.S. or coalition element. The latter gives the occupying force more freedom of maneuver, but the former is key to legitimate governance, a key goal of any counterinsurgency. If the host nation is sovereign, the quality of the governance they provide also has an impact. The scale of the effort is another factor; what works in a small country like El Salvador might not work in a large one like Iraq. A large "occupying" force or international counterinsurgency effort is a factor that can facilitate success in training indigenous forces, but also clearly complicates the situation in the host country. There are certainly other factors, but the idea is that many factors have an impact on training an army to combat insurgency. Those trainers must be acutely aware of the challenges involved and be quick to adapt to changing situations.

By almost any measure, the war in Iraq, from 2003 to the present, must be considered as occupying the "high end" of any counterinsurgency and indigenous training model, so not all of the lessons of Iraq will apply across the spectrum of insurgent conflict. As with any "lessons of history," lessons from the Iraq example must be treated skeptically and applied judiciously, but the war and the training of Iraqi Security Forces present several valuable guidelines for success in that continuing fight and for any similar situations in future wars.

Pillars of Indigenous Security Force Training

Success in the training effort in Iraq, according to the Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq, hinged on three pillars: training and equipping the Iraqi Security Forces to standard, the use of transition teams to guide the development of leaders and staffs, and partnership between the U.S./coalition forces on the ground and the developing Iraqi forces.

Training and equipping to standard. "To standard" may be the operative term in this pillar of indigenous security force training. The standards for the training and equipping of an indigenous force must be developed by studying and adapting to the tactical and operational situations on the ground. In Iraq, organizing the Iraqi Security Forces was the first step in defining those standards. Initial plans called for three infantry divisions oriented on defending against external threats, complemented by various police forces (mostly in community stations) to maintain law and order within Iraq's borders. Because the coalition could provide combat support and other combat enablers, the original force design focused on combat organizations.

An enduring lesson from Iraq is that the U.S. and coalition forces must be flexible and adapt to changing situations. As the insurgency matured on the ground, the desired size of the Iraqi military grew and their focus went from external threats to counterinsurgency. While maintaining the Iraqi Army's ability to evolve into a more conventional military, the organizers of the Iraqi Army changed the organizational design from that of a force to defend Iraq's borders to one designed to work with the police and the coalition forces to eliminate a deadly insurgency. The organization of the police forces similarly matured, from the Western and peacetime notion of lightly armed forces operating in a benign environment to that of a more paramilitary organization. Individual police stations enforcing law and order remained the goal, but the evolving organization needed some larger units for establishing law and order in the most troubled regions of the country. The organization of the Iraqi Security Forces adapted to the situation as the insurgency unfolded.

Once organizational design and size are determined, defining an ideal force seems fairly simple: that force would have the latest in weapons and technology, would be highly trained utilizing the best training methodologies found around the world, would be free of corruption and any tendency to violate human rights, and would be loyal to the central government. But just as organizations must adapt to tactical and operational imperatives, so must training and equipping. The most modern equipment was not the right equipment for the Iraqis. The new Iraqi Army, like the old one, was to be equipped with less modern Warsaw Pact equipment. Many of the Iraqis knew how to operate and maintain it. Their cash-strapped government had a better chance of being able to afford its acquisition, operation and maintenance. (Acquisition was especially helped by the willingness of the newer NATO nations to donate the surfeit of Warsaw Pact equipment they had on hand.) For forces well trained in the modern military system, the Warsaw Pact equipment meets the equipment standard; a well-trained force facing a technologically superior force with a lesser level of training will very likely be able to achieve its goals or at least to thwart achievement of the enemy's goals.