Transformational recapitalization: rethinking USAF aircraft procurement philosophies

Defense AT&L, Nov-Dec, 2004 by Sheila R. Ronis

A dozen years have passed since the end of the Cold War, and a new world is emerging--one that is different from what many imagined. The struggle for economic power is becoming the focus of our allies, while terrorism is becoming the focus of our foes. With no near-peer competitor to keep military operations in check, we have seen increasing use of our forces to combat smaller uprisings and terrorism. Maintaining our economic strength and military superiority in this new world requires transformational thinking at the very core of our systems acquisition philosophy.

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"Maintaining our unchallenged military superiority requires investment to ensure the current readiness of deployed forces while continuing to transform military capabilities for the future. Our adversaries will learn new lessons, adapt their capabilities, and seek to exploit perceived vulnerabilities. Therefore our military must transform and must remain ready, even while we are engaged in war." These words, spoken by the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Air Force Gen. Richard B. Myers, in his most recent posture statement to the Senate Armed Services Committee, point to a strategy of transformation, a strategy that balances the need to re-capitalize aging Cold War systems while reducing budget deficits and strengthening our own industrial base. This is not an easy task, but it is one worth pursuing.

As the Pentagon tries to transform itself for the 21st century, we're seeing mindset changes from threat-based responses to capabilities-based assessments. As a result, the Department of Defense has canceled Cold War programs like the Crusader and Comanche that are no longer of significant value. These decisions take courage, and DoD should be applauded for their efforts. The debate, however, needs to go even further. DoD should focus on whether investments in systems that were designed to counter a Cold War threat should be continued and on transforming the philosophies that drive the acquisition processes that produce those systems. Continuing to employ Cold War acquisition philosophies may very well be our real vulnerability.

Legacy of the Cold War Mentality

Dumaring the Cold War, our country's acquisition philosophy was straightforward: to use our robust industrial base to produce as many weapon systems as possible, as fast as possible, with the most advanced technology available. The country's industrial base was happy to oblige, as increased quantities meant reduced unit costs and increased profits. The government containment strategy in the Cold War used high quantities of systems with state-of-the-art technology to out-produce the Soviet Union. The United States overwhelmed the U.S.S.R. both economically and with global power projection. It was a great strategy for its time; it helped us win the Cold War.

In the 1990s, after decades of living in a Cold War environment, we put an emphasis on balancing the budget. Part of the transitional strategy in order to balance the budget in a world of peace and prosperity was not to change our Cold War acquisition philosophy, but just to put it on hold. We began looking for leaps in technology. We chose to modify and extend the life of existing systems while stretching out development programs in order to skip a technology generation. As a result, DoD now has too many old systems being extended way beyond their intended life. For example, according to Air Force officials, B-52s may be used more than 94 years; C-130s, more than 79 years; KC-135s, more than 86 years; and the F-15, more than 51 years. Obviously, none of these planes was designed to fly that long. With the unexpected increases in operations tempo since 9-11, our systems are aging even faster.

We now find ourselves with a looming problem. We cannot afford to recapitalize all our aging systems at the same time, yet each program is still being guided by the Cold War acquisition philosophy--to use our robust industrial base to produce as many weapon systems as possible, as fast as possible, with the most advanced technology available. Although budget constraints have limited what we can do (i.e., F-22 "buy to budget"), they have not yet changed our philosophical approach. It's time for a new philosophy that recognizes that we don't need the most advanced technology quickly, that we don't need to deliver as many units as fast as possible, but that we do need to preserve an industrial base that is not as robust as we would like to believe.

U.S. Aerospace Preeminence Threatened

With the rise of globalization, U.S. industrial base health and that of the defense industrial base and its organic component show signs of weakening.

The November 2002 Final Report of the Commission on the Future of the United States Aerospace Industry states: "The contributions of aerospace to our global leadership have been so successful that it is assumed U.S. preeminence in aerospace remains assured. Yet the evidence would indicate this to be far from the case. The U.S. aerospace industry has consolidated to a handful of players--from what was once over 70 suppliers in 1980 down to five prime contractors today."