IUID: an end-to-end look at cross-functional relationships

Defense AT&L, Nov-Dec, 2007 by Kimberly Meyer

Since its introduction in July 2003, the initial emphasis of item-unique identification (IUID) implementation has been on new acquisitions because of the myriad decisions to be made on a case-by-case basis: where to mark, testing and certification after marking, cost of marking and reading equipment, contracting implementation, and many other issues. However, now that the initial implementation processes are maturing for new items, it's time to take a more comprehensive look at integrating IUID requirements across the Department of Defense.

Recent IUID forums and policy documents have, in fact, expanded their focus to include the three main areas requiring IUID: new items, legacy items, and property in possession of the contractor (PIPC, formerly known as government-furnished equipment or GFE). A Feb. 6, 2007, policy update signed by Ken Krieg, former under secretary of defense for acquisition, technology and logistics, reinforces this expanded focus by placing emphasis on "sustaining momentum toward achieving paperless management of property in the possession of contractors in FY2007 and furthering depot planning and implementation." While these processes are receiving more emphasis, there is still little discussion of the three areas in relation to each other and the processes, initiatives, and functions impacting each area. This article relates the three key areas for an end-to-end, cross-functional perspective of implementing IUID on new items, legacy items, and PIPC. (The end-to-end concept is represented pictorially in a graphic available on the Acquisition Community Connection Unique Identification special interest area at <https://acc.dau.mil/uid>.)

The program manager is ultimately responsible for implementing IUID on Department of Defense programs, whether new items, modifications, or legacy items. When structuring a program to implement IUID, the PM must take a broader, cross-functional perspective of UID and look beyond how and where to mark an item. While the paths to implementing IUID for new and legacy items are somewhat different, there are many tasks in common that the PM needs to consider. Once items are marked, the culmination of IUID implementation is entry into the IUID Registry--but that is certainly not the end of the process. Data and information contained in the IUID Registry must be fed back into multiple asset-management data systems across the Department. These systems, with the common data key of an IUID, will allow the PM insight into managed assets and will provide better data for decision making.

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The vision of IUID implementation is the generation of better decision-making data within DoD for faster, more efficient acquisition, repair, and deployment of items. The question: How can we make this vision a reality? The answer: With an end-to-end, cross-functional focus. There are three key tasks common to new items or to modifications and legacy items at the depot that significantly impact the success or failure of IUID implementation within a program; they are the focus of this article:

* Integrated product teams (IPTs)

* Contracting for IUID

* Data entry into the IUID registry.

The Importance of Cross-Functional Involvement

IUID implementation is a very broad and complex initiative, and for successful implementation, the PM must have a team of dedicated, knowledgeable, functional experts to ensure all IUID requirements have been fully understood and incorporated. This IPT must include personnel from multiple functions such as program management, contracting, financial management, engineering, logistics, property, item management, and equipment management. The participation of all these functions is necessary so that no important areas are forgotten when planning for IUID implementation. Lack of cross-functional involvement in planning can have far-reaching consequences for the program and the Department as a whole--but in the end, it is the warfighter who bears the brunt.

What are some situations where lack of effective IPT involvement could lead to less-than-successful IUID implementation? One example is a poorly written contract that does not clearly lay out the IUID requirements for the contractor; another is a contract that can't be enforced when items are delivered improperly marked. If contracting personnel aren't brought into the team during the planning stages, it may be very difficult to construct the contract in the required format for IUID. When IUID was first implemented in the Department, many program offices followed the guidance and included the DFARS (Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement) clause in the contract but did not fully identify for the contractor the items they intended to be marked. When the contractor delivered the items at the end of the contract and they weren't marked, the government had no recourse but to accept them because the government's communication of requirements to the contractor had not been clear.

Another example (overheard at the February 2007 San Diego, Calif., UID Forum) described a problem reading the IUID mark after items were delivered to the government. The part in question required direct part-marking by etching to a particular depth. Following the etching, the part was then painted to enhance its structural integrity. Unfortunately, the required layers of paint were thicker than the depth of the mark, rendering it unreadable. If the government engineers had been involved in the up-front planning for the item, the part-marking methodology could have been analyzed and adjusted so government funds would not have been spent to etch an item with a mark that subsequently couldn't be read.