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Japanese attack USS Panay
Spokesman Magazine, March, 2005 by Dennis F. Casey
During the early 20th century, China stood as a country that for American businessmen represented significant opportunity but also significant risk. Parts of the country were ready for economic growth and willing to entertain foreign investment in some industries. This was particularly evident in some Chinese urban areas. In many rural zones, however, lawlessness prevailed. For the long-term investor, domestic political circumstances made things highly unlikely for any sustained economic growth. Local unrest persisted throughout China.
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In the late 1920s five small shoal-draft river gunboats were built for patrolling the Yangtze River to protect American commerce and American nationals. By their design, the boats proved to be ideal for their intended purposes. The beginning of the civil war in China when local guerrilla bands populated many rural areas and attempted to gain influence made the mission for boats like the USS Panay all the more important. The Japanese invasion of China in 1931 intensified this environment of uncertainty.
On November 21, 1937, as Japanese forces were approaching Nanking, China, Chiang Kai-shek's foreign office sent word to the American Embassy that it would be wise to close its doors and evacuate all personnel. Chinese officials stressed that the poorly equipped and inadequately supplied Chinese Army simply could no longer hold back the advancing Japanese forces. The following day the American ambassador and most of the personnel from the embassy boarded the USS. Luzon and headed for safety. The rest of them made the decision to remain for another week and then boarded the USS Panay. American ambassador Joseph Grew informed the Japanese government of the American evacuation on Dec. 1.
Ten days later on December 11, the gunboat left with American officials and civilians and started up the Yangtze River, escorting three standard oil barges that the company wanted out of harm's way. Two British gunboats and other small British craft followed the same course.
For two miles the American flotilla sustained fire from Japanese shore batteries. The intent of the Japanese was to provoke the United States into a declaration of war. Militarists close to seizing full control in Japan hoped that a declaration of war by the United States would give them the final push needed to eliminate civilian influence in their government.
Japanese military goals, they thought, could be more easily obtained without resistance from civilian Japanese governmental officials. The shelling was so inaccurate that the Panay and the barges, even going against the current at slow speeds, were able to pull away without damage. Communications to the Panay on Dec. 11 indicated that Chinese troops were fleeing the capital and that a Japanese takeover of the entire country could not be far off. By all accounts the Panay needed to press forward and get away from the advancing Japanese.
At 11 a.m. on Dec. 12 the Panay and the three oil barges, Mei Ping, Mei Hsia and Mei An were anchored near Hoshien, located upstream from Nanking. American flags were hoisted on the masts and painted on the awnings and topsides so Japanese forces would be able to distinguish between them and Chinese vessels.
As it was a Sunday, time was taken out for all aboard the Panay to have their dinner. None of the craft's guns were manned and the day was clear, sunny and still. All seemed peaceful despite what was happening ashore several miles away. Just after 1:30 p.m. in the afternoon, three Japanese naval aircraft flew overhead and released 18 bombs. One of the bombs disabled the Panay's forward three-inch gun and wrecked the pilothouse, the sick bay and the fire room.
The captain of the Panay, Lieutenant Commander J.J. Hughes, and several others were wounded. Immediately after the first assault, 12 more planes dive-bombed and nine fighters strafed the barges and the Panay. The fighters made several runs over the vessels. The American crew fought back with .30-caliber machine guns on the ship but the outcome looked bleak. Just minutes after 2 p.m. with all propulsion lost and the main deck awash, Captain Hughes ordered the ship abandoned.
The attack, however, continued. Japanese planes then attacked the lifeboats on their way to shore. The fighters even strafed the reeds along the riverbank where the wounded were trying to get ashore or hide temporarily. Two of the three oil barges were destroyed. The Mei An captain, Carl H. Carlson, and several dozen of his crew perished when their barge sank. Twenty minutes after the first explosion, the 450-ton Panay with its 55-man crew and passengers began to sink. Finally at 3:54 p.m., the ship flooded and then rolled beneath the water. Two were dead and 48 were wounded, some seriously. The survivors of the attack cared for the wounded and assisted in getting word to the commander of the USS Oahu. Two days later the USS Oahu and the HMS Ladybird picked up the survivors.
In the immediate aftermath of the attack, several Americans including Joseph Grew felt a declaration of war would be forthcoming quickly. Much to his surprise, the apparent sincerity with which the Japanese government and people apologized and expressed the willingness to make reparations muted Mr. Grew's rising wrath. The official Japanese inquiry produced the explanation that the attack was an unfortunate mistake and that the ships painted with American flags had been mistaken for Chinese vessels. Lieutenant Mastake Okuyama, who led the attack confirmed that his orders were to sweep clear the Yangtze River of all shipping.
