Religious pluralism and US church membership: a reassessment

Sociology of Religion, Summer, 1999 by Daniel V.A. Olson

The analyses below bear primarily on the pluralism hypothesis. However, since pluralism is sometimes viewed as a direct measure of competition, the results may also bear on the competition hypothesis. These results suggest either that pluralism is not a good measure of the religious competition experienced by religious groups, or that competition does not have the predicted effects Finke and Stark describe, or that the predicted effects of competition are far outweighed by other, simultaneous effects of pluralism having the opposite effect. What might these countervailing forces be?

OPPOSING APPROACHES

Olson and Hadaway (1998) describe two sociological mechanisms, cognitive and social-behavioral, that predict a negative relationship between pluralism and religious involvement. Briefly, cognitive approaches such as Berger's (1967), argue that religious pluralism makes it harder for individuals to hold particular beliefs when confronted by a diversity of beliefs. As Stark and Bainbridge (1987) note, "if one's associates disagree [concerning religion], one will be forced to conclude that the proffered compensators [religious beliefs] are uncertain in value, perhaps not very valuable at all" (Stark and Bainbridge 1987: 290). Stark and Bainbridge (1987: 290) go on to predict that as societies becomes more pluralistic and "religions compete with one another in an open market," the less value people are likely to place on any given religious explanation.

Behavioral approaches, on the other hand suggest that people may be involved in a religion even if they doubt its truth. As Sherkat (1997) points out, people may engage, or refuse to engage, in religious behavior for non-religious reasons including example setting, and choosing to please or annoy important others. Moreover, religious behavior, including attendance, is subject to the observation, influences, preferences, and, most importantly, the positive and negative sanctions of others, especially one's closest associates, e.g., parents, spouse, and children (Sherkat and Wilson 1995; Sherkat 1997). Thus it may serve one's interests to be religiously involved even if one's personal preferences are for less involvement.

Drawing on Durkheim (1897 [1951]), Hirshi (1969), and Simmel (1955), Olson and Hadaway (1998) argue that two factors can reduce the conforming influences of social sanctions on religious behavior: the number of one's close social ties and the proportion of one's close social ties reinforcing the same religious identity. Thus, previous research shows that religious involvement is higher among persons with more close social ties, married persons, especially those with children (e.g., Iannaccone 1990, Hoge and Carroll 1978) and lower among those with fewer close social ties, the divorced, those who live alone, and those who have lost relationships through a recent geographic move (Wuthnow and Christiano 1978; Stark and Bainbridge 1997; Sherkat and Wilson 1995). All of these factors affect the number of one's close social ties.