The New Holy Clubs: Testing Church-to-Sect Propositions

Sociology of Religion, Summer, 2001 by Roger Finke, Rodney Stark

Roger Finke [*]

The familiar sect-to-church theory holds that successful sects will gradually become more church-like over time, reducing the level of tension they hold with their environment. H. Richard Niebuhr (1929), the originator of sect-to-church theory, took it for granted that transformation was possible only in the church-like direction -- that churches could not reverse the process and become more sectlike. Recent theoretical developments, however, suggest that under certain conditions, and where groups are market-dependent, religious organizations will shift in the direction of higher tension with their environment (Stark and Finke 2000). Using recent data from Methodist congregations, we test selected propositions from these new theoretical developments.

INTRODUCTION

It is the received wisdom that, once begun, the sect-to-church process is irreversible and that "secularization" is an absorbing state from which faith never returns. H. Richard Niebuhr (1929), the originator of sect-to-church theory, took it for granted that transformation was possible only in the church-like direction -- that churches could not reverse the process and become more sectlike. He theorized that only the lower classes want high tension faith and that sects are turned into churches when they are taken over by the upper classes. Because, in Niebuhr's view, the lower classes are incapable of reclaiming a church from elite control, no church ever could be transformed back in the sect-like direction.

While there have been several very insightful case studies of individual congregations that switched away from liberalism (especially Warner 1988), we have been unable to find even a hint in the theoretical literature that denominations can become more conservative, except for Benton Johnson's (1963:543) suggestion in a footnote that a shift in that direction "is at least conceivable." Indeed, our own historical research highlights how organizational revivalism, commitment, and growth tend to come from new sectarian movements, as the mainline denominations become more secularized and fall into decline (Finke and Stark 1992; Stark and Bainbridge 1985).

But our more recent theoretical developments suggest that under certain conditions, and where groups are market-dependent, religious organizations will shift in the direction of higher tension with their environment (Stark and Finke 2000). We define tension as the degree of distinctiveness, separation, and antagonism between a religious group and the "outside" world, and view the concept as a continuum. The familiar sect-to-church process illustrates how religious groups can move from the high tension end of the continuum (demanding sects) to the low tension end (mainline churches). The more recent theoretical arguments suggest, however, that religious groups might also opt for higher levels of tension, increasing their distinctiveness, separation, and antagonism with the surrounding environment.

This essay reviews selected portions of this theory and uses data on United Methodist congregations to test specific predictions on the effects such shifts will have on the religious organizations. Within the bosom of some of the lowest tension (or most liberal) American denominations there are now sufficient cases of clergy and congregations opting for greater tension to let us demonstrate that the transformation of sects into churches is entirely reversible and produces increased organizational vigor. In contrast, as low tension denominations opt for even lower levels of tension, they also opt for lower levels of commitment and participation.

THEORETICAL FOUNDATION FOR RENEWAL

In recent work we have shown that demand for religion approximates a bell-shaped curve (Stark and Finke 2000). That is, if we place religious demand on the "tension" continuum, with one end focusing on the supernatural to the fullest extent possible and the other end accepting only a remote and inactive conception of the supernatural, few will seek either extreme. Instead, the demand for religion will rise as we move away from each extreme, reaching a peak as we fall midway between the two ends of the continuum (see Figure 1). Few want a religion that forces complete submission, requiring a life of isolation from the secular society. Likewise, few want a religion whose god is so distant and powerless as to offer little assistance in daily living and few promises for the life hereafter. To the extent people seek religion, and not all do seek religion, the demand is the highest for religions that offer close relations with the supernatural and distinctive demands for membership, without isolating individuals fr om the culture around them. People are drawn, then, to religions that fall midway between the far ends of the continuum.

When applied to religious groups, this bell-shaped curve of religious demand helps explain the size of the market segment to which a group will appeal. When a group limits its appeal to either extreme of the continuum, it is confined to a small portion of the market. The ultra-strict sects, communes and religious orders, and the ultra-liberal New Age and Unitarian/Universalists are each appealing to a very limited segment of the total market. As groups appeal to the center of the continuum, however, the size of the potential market rises. Thus, most Americans are members of a congregation that falls somewhere between these two extremes.