Secularization, R.I.P - rest in peace

Sociology of Religion, Fall, 1999 by Rodney Stark

The second thing to notice about the secularization prophecies is that they are not directed primarily toward institutional differentiation - they do not merely predict the separation of church and state or a decline in the direct, secular authority of church leaders. Their primary concern is with individual piety, especially belief. Thus, Jefferson predicted the next generation would find Christian beliefs, and especially faith in the divinity of Jesus, implausible and would limit themselves to the minimalist conception of God sustained by Unitarians. What most concerned Engels were not bishops, but the religious "fantasies" of the masses. Freud wrote about religious illusions, not about church taxes, and Wallace (1966: 265) asserted that "belief in supernatural powers is doomed to die out, all over the world" because, as Bryan Wilson (1975: 81) explained, "The rational structure of society itself precludes much indulgence in supernaturalist thinking."

This is very significant because in recent years secularization has been defined in several ways (Hanson 1997; Tschannen 1991; Dobbelaere 1987; Shiner 1967) and, unfortunately, this permits some proponents of the thesis to shift definitions as needed in order escape inconvenient facts (cf., Dobbelaere 1987, 1997; Lechner 1991, 1996; Yamane 1997). One definition, often referred to as the macro version (cf., Lechner 1996), identifies secularization as de-institutionalization (Dobbelaere 1987; Martin 1978). This refers to a decline in the social power of once-dominant religious institutions whereby other social institutions, especially political and educational institutions, have escaped from prior religious domination.

If this were all that secularization means, there would be nothing to argue about. Everyone must agree that, in contemporary Europe, for example, Catholic bishops have less political power than they once possessed, and the same is true of Lutheran and Anglican bishops (although bishops probably never were nearly so powerful as they now are thought to have been). Nor are primary aspects of public life any longer suffused with religious symbols, rhetoric, or ritual. These changes have, of course, aroused scholarly interest, resulting in some distinguished studies (Casanova 1994; Martin 1978). But, the prophets of secularization theory were not and are not merely writing about something so obvious or limited. At issue is not a narrow prediction concerning a growing separation of church and state. Instead, as we have seen, from the start the prophets of secularization have stressed personal piety, and to the extent that they expressed macro interests it has been to claim that they are so linked that a decline in one necessitates a decline in the other. Thus, if the churches lose power, personal piety will fade; if personal piety fades, the churches will lose power. Indeed, Peter Berger, long the most sophisticated modern proponent of the secularization thesis, was entirely candid on this point. Having outlined the macro aspects of secularization, Berger (1967: 107-108) noted: