What Really Happens When Prophecy Fails: The Case of Lubavitch

Sociology of Religion, Fall, 2001 by Simon Dein

Simon Dein [*]

Until fairly recently Festinger's theory of cognitive dissonance has been the standard paradigm for understanding reactions to foiled prophecy. This theory has been criticized on both empirical and theoretical grounds. Festinger's approach fails to pay sufficient attention to the perspectives and interpretations of followers, who are seen by him as irrational and driven by forces beyond their understanding. This paper examines messianic belief among Lubavitchers and discusses what happened when their leader died without revealing his messianic status. Following failed prophecy, Lubavitchers continued missionizing at the same high level as previously. The case material illustrates the fact that such an intense religious group as Lubavitch do not follow teachings blindly but are sane people who try to reason their way through facts and doctrine in pursuit of understanding. Lubavitchers dealt with this failure of prophecy by appealing to a number of post-hoc rationalisations. In accordance with Melton's (1985) t heory, the messianic belief underwent a process of spiritualization.

INTRODUCTION

For religious groups there can be no greater disappointment than that which occurs after the failure of a major prophecy to materialize. The historical literature is replete with examples of groups who have predicted the end of the world and their reactions to failed prophecy. Stark (1996:137) asserts:

Other things being equal, failed prophecies are harmful for religious movements. Although prophesies may arouse a great deal of excitement and attract many new followers beforehand, the subsequent disappointment usually more than offsets these benefits.

His argument is that in some instances members may leave the group and the group finally disintegrates. In other cases, members can withstand this catastrophic event and the group continues. However, he qualifies this statement by asserting that new religious movements are likely to succeed to the extent that their doctrines are non-empirical. Religious movements need not deliver on their promises in this world -- their most valuable rewards are obtained in a reality beyond inspection.

The standard paradigm for understanding failed prophecy is based on cognitive dissonance theory (Festinger, Reiken and Schachter 1956). Following their research on a flying saucer movement, Festinger and his colleagues argued that failure of prophecy resulted in intensification of belief and more enthusiastic proselytising by sect members. Proselytization, the attempt to convince outsiders of a belief system, was regarded as reducing cognitive dissonance. If more people adopt this belief it must after all be true. According to Festinger et al. (1956:3):

Man's resourcefulness goes simply beyond protecting a belief. Suppose an individual believes something with his whole heart; suppose further that he has a commitment to this belief, but he has taken irrevocable actions because of it; finally suppose that he is presented with evidence, unequivocal and undeniable evidence, that his belief is wrong: What will happen? The individual will frequently emerge, not only unshaken but even more convinced of the truth of his beliefs than ever before. Indeed, he may even show a new fervor about convincing and converting other people to his view.

Festinger argued that for such a process to occur there must be firm conviction; there must be public commitment to this conviction; the conviction must be amenable to unequivocal disconfirmation; such unequivocal disconfirmation must occur; and lastly, social support must be available to the believer subsequent to the disconfirmation. To reduce psychological dissonance, Festinger's theory of cognitive dissonance predicts that the dissonance produced by disconfirming information will be reduced by adding new cognitions consonant with the set of cognitions most resistant to change.

This theory, however, has come under some criticism by scholars of religion, on both methodological and theoretical grounds. The validity of their original research has been questioned (Melton 1985; Van Fossen 1988; Bainbridge 1997). Van Fossen (1988) refers to Festinger as a "radically deficient guide" to studying the effects of failed prophecy, whose work is tainted by subjectivity and bias. Although concerns have been raised in relation to the possible stimulating effect on the group by Festinger's researchers, there is no evidence that this in fact occurred (Batson and Ventis 1982).

Stone (2000) argues that studies on failed prophecy post-Festinger indicate that active proselytization is an uncommon occurrence. In most of the case studies discussed in his book Expecting Armageddon: Essential readings in failed prophecy, proselytization did not occur (Hardyck and Braden 1962; Balch, Farnsworth and Wilkins 1983). Similarly, Dawson (1999) argues that Festinger's approach is too narrow and that increased proselytization is only one way of reducing dissonance and is by no means the most common response. Bader (1999:120) states quite categorically, "Nevertheless, no case study of a failed prophecy, his current research included, has provided support for the cognitive dissonance hypothesis."