And the wisdom to know the difference? Freedom, control and the sociology of religion - 2002 Presidential Address

Sociology of Religion, Fall, 2003 by Eileen Barker

TENSIONS BETWEEN COMPETING FREEDOMS

In the contemporary quest for freedom it is possible to observe a seemingly contradictory relationship between freedom on the one hand, and choice and control on the other. The contradiction lies in the fact that either too much or too little choice and/or control can lead to a diminution of freedom. In other words, while it might seem fairly obvious that removing choices and imposing controls can decrease freedom, and that increasing choices and reducing control can increase freedom, it is also true that reducing choices and imposing controls can result in a subjective experience of more rather than less freedom; and reducing controls and having more choices can result in less rather than more freedom.

The theoretical reasoning behind this statement starts from the definition I suggested earlier: (a) choice depends on our being able to anticipate possible futures; (b) any reliable anticipation must depend on order and predictability; (c) Just as one cannot have choice without order and predictability, one cannot have freedom without control. (17) Let us, however, look at some empirical examples.

It has been suggested that the contemporary West (Europe, North America, Australia and New Zealand) is one of those times and places when traditional religious authority has been relatively ineffective as a controlling influence in individuals' lives. (18) While the vast majority of people remain in the religion into which they were born, the West has seen an increasing number choosing to move away from traditional institutional religion in a number of directions. These may be divided into five main ideal types. First, there are what may be called the "hard secularists" who reject the existence of God or gods and who may belong to some Humanist Association or follow a Marxist/Leninist or other atheistic ideology. Secondly, there are the "soft secularists" who differ significantly from the previous type in that they do not deny the existence of God, but see no reason to attend a place of worship or bring religion into their lives--except on occasions of stress or, perhaps, as part of a rite de passage, at which times they expect the professionals to be there to provide whatever support is needed or appropriate. Thirdly, there are fundamentalist groups that have a strong belief in The Truth and who tend to separate themselves from the trot of society with a strong social, and sometimes geographical, boundary. Unlike the soft secularists, their religion is a primary source of their identity and has a bearing on pretty well every aspect of their highly structured lives. In these groups there is relatively little room for individuals to interpret their beliefs or negotiate their behaviour, such matters being decided by the group's scripture and/or leaders. The fourth type is in many ways diametrically opposed to the third. It is one in which, to use its own language, spirituality rather than religiosity is celebrated. God is perceived as something within each individual rather than "out there." External authority is rejected in favour of personal responsibility; bounded groups are replaced by networks of the like-minded; and there is frequently a stress on the feminine and ecological values. Fifthly, there are the NRMs, about which it is impossible to generalise, but which can be seen to span all the previous types, but particularly those of fundamentalism and spirituality.