Rethinking religious social action: what is "rational" about rational-choice theory?

Sociology of Religion, Summer, 1998 by James V. Spickard

DISSECTING THE ASSUMPTIONS

Enough praise. Whether or not rational-choice theory is right, it at least does not commit the same sins as the theory it tries to replace. The problem is, the first two of Iannaccone's assumptions are demonstrably false and the third is so vague as to be nearly useless. Let us take these one at a time.

Maximization

First, people do not actually act only according to a means-ends rationality. There are, at least, three ideal-typical modes of rational action, only one of them "weighing the costs and benefits of potential actions, and choosing those actions that maximize their net benefits" (Iannaccone 1997: 26). Stealing terms from philosophical ethics, we can refer to these as teleological, deontological, and cathekontic actions (Taylor 1975; Niebuhr 1963).

Teleological action is typified by means-ends rationality; utilitarianism is the best known example. This is the rationality Iannaccone favors, and it needs little elaboration here. It is a rationality of means. Ends are given, and thus are potentially irrational; rationality involves the careful calculation of the most efficient means to reach them. Max Weber named this "zweck-rationalitat": "goal-rational action," to use one of the most common translations (Weber 1922: 26). ("Instrumental rationality" is another favored term.)

Deontological action is also rational, however, and is what Weber called "wert-rationalitat." "Value-rationality" grounds action in some transcendent value or ideal, which it claims must be followed without regard to benefit or cost. In Weber's action-schema, any action that was undertaken for the sake of rules was value-rational.

Examples of pure value-rational orientation would be the actions of persons who, regardless of possible cost to themselves, act to put into practice their convictions of what seems to them to be required by duty, honor, the pursuit of beauty, a religious call. . . . In our terminology, value-rational action always involves 'commands' or 'demands' which, in the actor's opinion, are binding on him (Weber 1922, pp. 24-25).

At first blush, this seems to be much like teleological action, with "values" substituting for "goals." Indeed, some rational choice advocates (e.g., Stark 1997: 6-7; Iannaccone 1995a: 82) have explicitly argued that deontology is just teleology in disguise. But two traits render this equation false. First, as Weber pointed out, value-rationality is consistent, where goal-rationality is merely calculating: the former will pursue its goal no matter what, while the latter will do so only so long as benefits outweigh costs. Though both are rational, in some situations they would generate different results.

Second, values can themselves be rational, where goals are not. Kant (1785) grounded his supreme value - the categorical imperative - in Reason itself. He showed that all rational beings must agree to be treated as they wish to treat others: not because they benefit from doing so but because their very rationality demands it. Thus teleological action - the weighing of costs and benefits - is for Kant irrational because it lacks rational goals. Only deontological action is rational through and through (see Taylor 1975; Rachels 1986; Paton 1967).