How prophecy never fails: interpretive reason in a flying-saucer group

Sociology of Religion, Summer, 1998 by Diana Tumminia

Until recently little was known about the culture of flying-saucer groups, except for a few notable studies (Festinger, et al. 1956; Buckner 1966; Stupple and Dashi 1977; Wallis 1974). Recently the worldview of such spiritual groups have been better documented and inspected (Balch and Taylor 1978; Bartholomew 1989, 1991; Kirkpatrick and Tumminia 1992; Lewis 1995), revealing a complex picture of organizational and interpretive life. Aiming at increasing that body of knowledge from an ethnographic and an ethnomethodological perspective, this study looks into the prophecy of a particular flying-saucer group, Unarius Academy of Science, headquartered in El Cajon, California. The five-year investigation (1988-1993) employed the methods of participant observation and archival research, as well as formal interviews of members and ex-members. Through descriptive analysis, I discuss the events surrounding the Unarian prediction of a mass starship landing. Following this, I will illustrate how contemporary members interpret their failed prophesy in ways that maintain the validity of their beliefs.

Pollner's (1987) notion of "mundane reason" speaks directly to an analysis of logic and interpretive reason in the presence of irrefutable evidence to the contrary. Social actors must make sense out of contradictory evidence and disputed claims of this or that reality. Simply put, they must solve the interpretive mystery of what really happened using their own socially constructed logic. The explanatory repertoire of Unarians is an instructive example of mundane reason and the power of unfalsifiable belief. In the resulting discussion, it will be shown how present-day Unarians verify the reality of the prophecy's fulfillment by accounting for errors on the part of outside interpretations. In accounting for interpretative errors, members experience the logic of their adherence to the organization and the rationality of their commitment to its experiential reality.

WHEN PROPHECY FALLS

In trying to solve the mystery of what really happened in Unarius, I began my own speculation with the work that offered the most specificity, When prophecy fails (1956) by Leon Festinger, Henry W. Riecken, and Stanley Schachter. Festinger, et al. (1956) argue that disconfirmation may actually strengthen belief. Five conditions are expected to be present for the heightening of commitment in the face of contradictory evidence: 1) a deep belief must be held and cause a noticeable change in behavior, 2) as a result of this belief, the person must take irrevocable action, 3) real events discredit the belief, 4) the contradictory evidence is recognized by the believer, 5) social support is present after the disconfirmation. Increased proselytizing is expected if the five conditions are met. After major disconfirmatory events, groups presumably seek new converts, reasoning that if newcomers believe, so can the people with shaken beliefs.

A careful reading reveals not one discrete prophecy, but a series of failed prophecies which the group endured. Before the grand prophecy, the leader of the small band of believers, Mrs. Keech, predicted a succession of specific sites to await the landing of flying saucers. Each time the prediction proved fruitless, with the exception that the empty encounters were reinterpreted as being meaningful tests of faith. After the third disappointment, only five members of the original group stayed. Despite this, Mrs. Keech's steadfast followers, the Armstrongs, spread the cosmic messages to new seekers, who in turn became part of the group that experienced the major disconfirmation event.

While there is much to be admired in Festinger's classic, the piece has been the subject of criticism by scholars of religion. J. Gordon Melton (1985) strongly criticizes When prophecy fails (1956) for setting the standard for the study of millennial groups. Melton points out that subsequent research (Hardyck and Braden 1962; Balch, Farnsworth, and Wilkins 1983) failed to replicate notions of cognitive dissonance. Melton takes issue with many of the premises upon which the investigation was founded. First, the study's thesis rests upon historical error; Festinger, et al. wrongly report that Millerites (an Adventist group led by William Miller, who predicted the end of the world and the Second Coming in the 1830s) disbanded after a failed prophecy. Second, the authors state that millennial groups are organized around the prediction of prospective events. As Melton sees it, this one-dimensional view of millenarianism neglects the presence of a complex cosmology or integrated group life. Melton argues that the notion that a single belief organizes millennial groups is commonly held by the media, religious rivals, and distant scholars. Generally speaking, if prophecy were the only organizing principle, its disconfirmation would prove injurious to group life. However, since prediction often springs from a broad context of belief, nonconfirmation provides a "test" which usually strengthens a group (Melton 1985: 20).